Re: [Acme] Considerations about ACME BoF

Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> Mon, 30 March 2015 22:01 UTC

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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Mon, 30 Mar 2015 15:00:31 -0700
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To: Scott Rea <Scott.Rea@digicert.com>
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Subject: Re: [Acme] Considerations about ACME BoF
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On Mon, Mar 30, 2015 at 1:00 PM, Scott Rea <Scott.Rea@digicert.com> wrote:
>
> > On the contrary, letsencrypt could use DANE TLSA records as DV proofs
> > which would drive deployment of DANE.
> I actually think Max is making the opposite argument - that the proposal
> is "anti CA" (or maybe anti X.509) and "pro DANE" and asking for
> justification of why we want to move away from the current
> implementation base to an unproven trust model that extremely few have
> demonstrated a willingness to adopt at this point


Hmm, I'm not sure how you and Max got this out of the discussion in the
meeting, but perhaps I can clarify.

ACME has two potential interactions with DANE.

1. DANE can be used a "proof type" to allow ACME CAs to determine that
a given entity controls a given domain.

2. If an ACME CA (or any CA) issues free certificates based on DANE, then
this is a potential way to allow DANE-based trust to get wider deployment.
This isn't really a property of ACME but rather of free, automatic issuance,
regardless of the protocol.

But in neither case is ACME really about moving to the DANE trust model.

Best,
-Ekr