Re: [dmarc-ietf] ARC vs reject

[Michael Thomas <[e-mail]>]

On 12/5/20 6:04 PM, Jim Fenton wrote:
>
> I’d like to step back from the specific use case of “a bank”.
>
> If a domain publishes p=reject, they’re requesting particular handling 
> of a message they originate. ARC modifies that, which is good for 
> mailing lists and similar intermediaries, but depends on a list of 
> trusted intermediaries that is not under the control of the 
> originating domain. That increases the attack surface for DMARC 
> considerably.
>
> The question I have is: Should DMARC have a policy (or policy 
> modifier) that says, “Do not accept modifications to this message?” In 
> other words, that the originator values the integrity of their 
> messages over deliverability.
I'm in the middle of reading rfc  7960 and lo and behold I found this. 
So I'm not the only one who has thought about this.

"

To further complicate the usage of mitigations, mitigation may not be
    desired if the email in question is of a certain category of high
    value or high risk (security-related) transactional messages (dealing
    with financial transactions or medical records, for example).  In
    these cases, mitigating the impact of DMARC due to indirect email
    flows may not be desirable (counterproductive or allowing for abuse)"


And the example they use is exactly the example I used.

Mike