Re: [dmarc-ietf] easier DKIM, DMARC2 & SPF Dependency Removal

[Barry Leiba <[e-mail]>]

I don't understand how most of your message fits into this discussion:
you're comparing SPF's policy points with DMARC policy.  we're talking
about SPF as an authentication mechanism together with DKIM (not
DMARC) as an authentication mechanism... and then using those
authentication results in DMARC policy evaluation.

But here: I've said all this before in separate places, so I'll put it
in one place, here, one more time:

Given that SPF and DKIM are both configured properly:
1. If SPF passes, DKIM will always pass.
2. If DKIM fails, SPF will always fail.
3. In some scenarios, DKIM will pass when SPF fails.

Therefore, when everything is configured properly, SPF adds no value
beyond what DKIM does, and DKIM does add value beyond what SPF does.
That's why I am (and others are) arguing that we should remove SPF
*from DMARC evaluation*.  There's no argument that for now, or some,
SPF outside of DMARC still has value.

What others are arguing is that in the real world, things do get
mis-configured, and if DKIM is misconfigured and fails when it
shouldn't, SPF adds value by providing a working authentication.
(And, of course, similarly the other way around, plus DKIM covers some
cases when messages are relayed or forwarded.)  That speaks for "SPF
*or* DKIM".

But "SPF *and* DKIM" -- requiring *both* to pass -- is technically
unnecessary at best, because of (1) above: DKIM should always pass
when SPF passes.  But where the harm comes is in cases of
mis-configuration, because now if *either* of them is misconfigured,
the whole thing fails -- neither of them serves as a backup for the
other; instead, the misconfiguration of either one causes
deliverability problems.  DMARC is damaged by requiring an
authentication situation that is unnecessary when things are properly
configured, and that is more fragile than what we've been using, more
susceptible to configuration errors than we've seen before.

And I'm afraid that people will use it preferentially, *thinking* that
it provides better "security" -- surely, double authentication is
better than single, no?

No.

Barry

On Tue, Jun 27, 2023 at 6:36 AM Alessandro Vesely <[e-mail]> wrote:
>
> On Mon 26/Jun/2023 20:13:53 +0200 Barry Leiba wrote:
> > I'm saying I don't want "and" to be an option, because I think it's
> > damaging to DMARC.  There is no reason anyone should ever want to say
> > that, and providing the option asks for misconfigurations because
> > people think it's somehow "more secure".  It's not more secure.  It
> > would be very bad for deliverability of legitimate mail and would
> > provide no additional security.  It would be a terrible mistake.
>
>
> I've been sporting spf-all for years, and seldom experienced bounces, mostly
> due to misconfigured secondary MXes.  Out of 39 domains whose posts to this
> list in the past year are still in my inbox, 14 have spf-all.  So, while I'm
> not the only one, not many published -all even though it may seem to be somehow
> more secure.
>
> I think it can be worth to compare SPF and DMARC.  Another sender policy a
> decade and an authentication method after.  What adoption, what hype.
>
> Both policies ask receivers to reject a domain identifier in some cases.  RFC
> 7208 explicitly suggests to consider whitelisting (Appendix D).  DMARC provides
> for overrides but is less clear about how to handle exceptions.  After SPF
> broke forwarding, the reaction was split between some changing identifier and
> turning to ~all; after DMARC broke mailing lists, between changing identifier
> and not altering messages.  In my limited experience, the ratio seems to be
> higher for DMARC than SPF, but I may be wrong.
>
> In theory, domains that currently have a strict DMARC policy and spf-all, 6 of
> the above, should have their messages blocked when either method fails, up to
> changing identifiers.  Why would it be so bad for deliverability to
> additionally require DMARC alignment, which is the difference between that and
> the "and"?
>
> And, it seems to me that an ESP not having a bloated SPF record could stop a
> good deal of DKIM replay by resorting to auth=dkim+spf.  Besides collateral
> deliverability problems, why wouldn't that work?
>
> Wht would "and" damage DMARC more than -all damaged SPF?
>
> I hope we can discuss detailed criticism rather than vague ostracism.
>
>
> Best
> Ale
> --
>
>
>
>
>