[Hipsec-rg] 答复: 答复: Key Revocation Issue

It isn't reasonable to assume that each host is associated with a FQDN  
(unless we make it so, for instance by constructing said FQDN out of  
the HIT), for the majority of devices.  For example, is my cellphone  
associated with an FQDN?  If so, is that FQDN at all useful for  
access, identification or authorisation?  Probably not, since it is  
under the control of the cellphone carrier; they might be able to use  
it for some of those purposes, but I can't.

I believe it to be a design goal of HIP that it should be useful  
without connectivity to the DNS; DNS record formats and packets may be  
useful, but HIP itself should not require that any host have an FQDN  
nor any ability to do DNS queries (except perhaps by querying its  
immediate HIP peers... and even then, only for information about those  
peers themselves, in zeroconf style).

Andrew

On 23/01/2009, at 4:02 PM, Zhang Dacheng wrote:

> Hi,
>
> I absolutely agree that FQDNs cannot directly be used for session
> authentication etc.  But we need to clarify that the original  
> objective of
> designing HIP is separation of IDs and locators rather than  
> security. I
> agree security is an important functionality provided by HIP. But I  
> am not
> convinced that HITs cannot be taken placed by FQDNs just because HIT  
> can be
> used for security purposes. If so, why cannot we just associate with  
> each
> FQDN with a PKI certificate? There has been lots of work on session
> authentication using certificates. This solution seems much easier  
> to be
> achieved than modifying the protocol stack.
>
> In addition, do you have any idea about whether it is reasonable to  
> assume
> that each HIP host is associated with a FQDN?
>
> Best wishes,
>
> Dacheng Zhang
>
>
>> Excerpts from Zhang Dacheng on Thu, Jan 22, 2009 10:43:02AM +0800:
>>> I agree that it is an intuitive solution to solve the key
>> revocation
>>> issue with DNS. However, my concern is whether it is
>> reasonable for us
>>> to assume that every host has a FQDN. If yes, the
>> importance of HIP is
>>> largely weakened. We can use FQDN rather than HI to achieve the
>>> separation of ID from Locator.
>>
>> As far as I can see this isn't true.  Different "identification"
>> functions have different needs.  You can use a FQDN as an
>> identifier for initial discovery of a location, but you
>> cannot use it for session authentication or control.  To
>> start with you would be subject to man-in-the-middle attacks.
>>
>> Scott
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