Re: [Idr] I-D Action: draft-ietf-idr-large-community-01.txt

Nick Hilliard <nick@foobar.org> Sat, 08 October 2016 16:35 UTC

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Date: Sat, 08 Oct 2016 17:35:15 +0100
From: Nick Hilliard <nick@foobar.org>
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To: Brian Dickson <brian.peter.dickson@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [Idr] I-D Action: draft-ietf-idr-large-community-01.txt
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Brian Dickson wrote:
> Is there anything you envision in use of large communities that
> cannot be supported by use of ASNs and private ASNs? I can't see
> anything that would not fit into those two use cases.

There are plenty of situations where the semantics of what you're
suggesting would be troublesome to define, for example, confederations,
asn translation or asn migration, leading to cases where there would be
multiple asns being legitimate on a single router.

And even if these cases could be cleared up easily, what happens when
someone injects a prefix tagged with a community which isn't the same as
their ASN?  You're then stuck with the situation where you're defining
one thing as a MUST in the semantic specification section of the rfc,
while down in the Security Considerations section, it's going to need to
be admitted that there's no guarantee whatsoever that the global
administrator field in the large community was actually set by the ASN
which announced the prefix.  Worse still, once it's been changed, there
is no practical way for a neighbor to detect this change, as s-bgp isn't
a thing.

Realistically, vendors are going to implement ways of modifying the
field in exactly the same way as rfc1997 communities can be set to
anything at all at any policy specification point in a bgp-enabled network.

Nick