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Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Discard Initial keys as soon as possible (#2045)

Kazuho Oku <notifications@github.com> Mon, 26 November 2018 03:14 UTC

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Subject: Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Discard Initial keys as soon as possible (#2045)
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@ekr 
> I thought the sense of the discussion in BKK was _not_ to do this. It's a weird kind of implicit ACKIng.

I share the view that it is a variant of implicit ACKing, something that we decided to not adopt in Kista. OTOH, it _is_ an improvement in terms of preventing man-on-the-side attacks that try to disrupt connection establishment.

IMO, the proposed approach is trivial to implement for everybody. In addition to that, it simplifies QUIC stacks that implement protection against Initial injection, because they are no longer required to continue responding to Initial packets (that might contain rogue information).

Considering the aspects, as stated in https://github.com/quicwg/base-drafts/issues/1951#issuecomment-438112817, I am now in favor of adopting this.

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