Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Include handshake anti-deadlock logic in pseudocode (#2281)

Benjamin Saunders <notifications@github.com> Wed, 16 January 2019 01:46 UTC

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Subject: Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Include handshake anti-deadlock logic in pseudocode (#2281)
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Ralith commented on this pull request.



> @@ -699,6 +703,9 @@ Pseudocode for OnAckReceived and UpdateRtt follow:
     largest_acked_packet = max(largest_acked_packet,
                                ack.largest_acked)
 
+    if (from Handshake packet):

> The client can know that it is unverified if it is sending Initial packets and not Handshake (or greater).

That's not true, though: the client doesn't know it's been validated until it's seen an ACK using Handshake keys (or greater). The server needs to see a Handshake packet to validate the client, and until the client's seen such an ACK it can't be sure that any Handshake packets it might have sent so far weren't lost.

> As for the test in SetLossDetectionTimer() or LossDetectionTimeout(), how is it possible for a crypto packet to be in flight, where this condition would be true?

I'm not sure I understand the question. The tests in those functions are to ensure that a client sends packets to either earn anti-amplification credit or validate its address even when it has no information to send.

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