Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encryption
Mirja Kühlewind <mirja.kuehlewind@tik.ee.ethz.ch> Wed, 02 May 2018 12:47 UTC
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Subject: Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encryption
From: Mirja Kühlewind <mirja.kuehlewind@tik.ee.ethz.ch>
In-Reply-To: <20180502121018.GF5742@akamai.com>
Date: Wed, 02 May 2018 14:46:51 +0200
Cc: Praveen Balasubramanian <pravb@microsoft.com>, IETF QUIC WG <quic@ietf.org>
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To: Benjamin Kaduk <bkaduk=40akamai.com@dmarc.ietf.org>
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Hi Ben, hi all, at this point, I'm fine with moving on with a decision and I didn’t speak up recently because I did feel that just repeating my point of view over and over again (like other do) would bring the discussion forward but I have to say that I’m still skeptical about the benefits of PNE. I don’t think that it will help linkability as mitigation can be easy detected with simple traffic analysis (if you see both flows; if you don’t see both flows you can’t detect it no matter what) and I rate the risk of ossification on the packet number rather low (both in terms of the risk that it will happen and if even if it happens that it will hinder protocol evolution strongly) such that I simply don’t think that it is justified to spend ANY additional complexity on PNE. I might be wrong and I understand the fear of people about what can happen in a worst case scenario, however, I also learned during my time in the IEFT that complexity itself can be a barrier for deployment that should not be underestimated. If people don’t understand the specs we write, they will not be able to implement (and maintain) our protocols, or at least not be able to implement it correctly which might be even worse for deployment and security (than not using them at all). Independent of the decision on PNE, I would like people to please keep in mind that while increased security is preferable, it does not mean that this is a free ticket to add encryption wherever we can, even if there are no or maybe yet unknown benefits as it always comes with a cost. Mirja > Am 02.05.2018 um 14:10 schrieb Benjamin Kaduk <bkaduk=40akamai.com@dmarc.ietf.org>: > > Hi Praveen, > > On Wed, May 02, 2018 at 02:02:37AM +0000, Praveen Balasubramanian wrote: >> We can get (1) done but I disagree that we can decouple (2). It doesn’t make sense to require performance overhead all the time with no benefit. For the Internet, PNE can prevent ossification so it is seen as a reasonable trade-off. For the datacenter, there is no known benefit, only cost. > > Most of why I am pushing back so hard on this point is that I am having a > *really* hard time getting the statement of "no benefit" (i.e., exactly zero) > to mesh with my understanding of the situation. I don't know the best > way past this impasse -- it doesn't really seem right for me to make a > list of potential benefits and have you shoot them down, for example. I > think maybe you are trying to make a slightly different point involving > something like ongoing operational benefits (as opposed to cost of > implementation/risk of bugs/ecosystem benefits), but I'm not entirely > sure. > >> We know that there is a CPU cost, this is not speculation. Doesn’t matter if >> the cost is 1% or 10%. Hardware implementers have also raised concerns. Every > > Well, I think it rather does matter for 1% vs. 10%. If it was 0.1% > (unlikely, I suppose), then that might be "in the noise" and not worth > doing anything about, ever. For a 1% cost, that's significant enough to > make me want to address it in my long-term plans, but it is not > necessarily a big enough impact to require immediate attention. 10%, on > the other hand, probably would require immediate attention and be a > show-stopper. > >> CPU cycle we spend on things that add no value to the user should be >> questioned. Every extra instruction we execute in the hot data path leaves >> less CPU for workloads, burns more power and makes for a worse comparison >> with HTTPS over TCP. The same argument as privacy holes holds here – just > > The "burns more power" argument can be applied to every single CPU > instruction; relative measures (i.e., percentage of total CPU) from > actual deployment are what I find to be most compelling. > >> because there are some existing perf bottlenecks doesn’t mean we add more, >> particularly ones we cannot mitigate. I said it before that there are lots of >> ways we can improve UDP perf but I don’t know of any technique for reducing >> crypto CPU cost other than hardware offload. > > And I ask again, who is "we"? (At this point I am mostly assuming "all > QUIC implementors", but it would be nice to be sure.) > >> The cost is certainly worth saving with something as simple as a negotiation >> mechanism. Am I missing something about a transport parameter being > >> From the rest of the discussion, I don't think you've really sold people > on "certainly", yet. > >> complicated to implement? Implementations are free to support only PNE and >> not negotiate anything else. There is actually an even simpler mechanism if a >> transport parameter is deemed as costly: if the peer sends PN = 0 in the CI, >> then its requesting no PNE and the receiver can choose to proceed or drop and >> force TCP fall back. This should take only an extra if check on the receiver >> CI processing logic to implement. I am assuming here that PNE on input of 0 >> will not produce 0 so it’s a safe sentinel value. > > I think some people are worried not just about the complexity/simplicity > of the mechanism implemented, but broader-scope ecosystem and > architecture issues, whether that's a general complexity reduction > initiative or more subtle issues involving middleboxes attempting to > coerce certain sorts of behavior. > > -Ben >
- Hardware acceleration and packet number encryption Christian Huitema
- Re: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Kazuho Oku
- Re: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Eric Rescorla
- Re: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Kazuho Oku
- Re: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Eric Rescorla
- RE: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Deval, Manasi
- Re: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Eric Rescorla
- Re: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Subodh Iyengar
- Re: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Eric Rescorla
- Re: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Christian Huitema
- Re: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Ian Swett
- Re: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Christian Huitema
- RE: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Deval, Manasi
- Re: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Salz, Rich
- Re: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Ian Swett
- RE: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Swindells, Thomas (Nokia - GB/Cambridge)
- RE: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Deval, Manasi
- Re: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Christian Huitema
- Re: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Jana Iyengar
- Re: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Ian Swett
- Re: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Watson Ladd
- RE: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Praveen Balasubramanian
- RE: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Praveen Balasubramanian
- RE: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- RE: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Praveen Balasubramanian
- Re: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Mark Nottingham
- RE: Hardware acceleration and packet number encry… Praveen Balasubramanian
- Getting to consensus on packet number encryption Mark Nottingham
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Willy Tarreau
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Mirja Kühlewind
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Dmitri Tikhonov
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Patrick McManus
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Spencer Dawkins at IETF
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Patrick McManus
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Brian Trammell (IETF)
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Brian Trammell (IETF)
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Patrick McManus
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Brian Trammell (IETF)
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Ted Hardie
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Mirja Kühlewind
- RE: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Mike Bishop
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Dmitri Tikhonov
- RE: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Praveen Balasubramanian
- RE: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- RE: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Praveen Balasubramanian
- RE: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Praveen Balasubramanian
- RE: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Lubashev, Igor
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Roberto Peon
- RE: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Lubashev, Igor
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Mark Nottingham
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Ian Swett
- RE: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Praveen Balasubramanian
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Mark Nottingham
- RE: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Praveen Balasubramanian
- RE: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- RE: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Praveen Balasubramanian
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Christian Huitema
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Kazuho Oku
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Martin Thomson
- RE: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Willy Tarreau
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Brian Trammell (IETF)
- ECN signaling from userland Re: Getting to consen… Lars Eggert
- Re: ECN signaling from userland Re: Getting to co… Brian Trammell (IETF)
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… alexandre.ferrieux
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Eric Rescorla
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Kazuho Oku
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Mirja Kühlewind
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Philipp S. Tiesel
- Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus on p… Christian Huitema
- Re: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Frederick Kautz
- Re: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Christian Huitema
- RE: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Praveen Balasubramanian
- Re: Privacy holes Gorry Fairhurst
- Re: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Kazuho Oku
- RE: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Mike Bishop
- RE: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Kazuho Oku
- Re: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Kazuho Oku
- RE: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Lubashev, Igor
- RE: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Praveen Balasubramanian
- Re: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Kazuho Oku
- Re: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Kazuho Oku
- RE: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Praveen Balasubramanian
- RE: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Lubashev, Igor
- RE: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Lubashev, Igor
- RE: ECN signaling from userland Re: Getting to co… Praveen Balasubramanian
- Re: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Kazuho Oku
- Re: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Frederick Kautz
- Re: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Willy Tarreau
- Re: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Martin Thomson
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Kazuho Oku
- Re: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Kazuho Oku
- Re: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Kazuho Oku
- Re: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Martin Thomson
- Re: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Kazuho Oku
- Re: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Kazuho Oku
- RE: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Lubashev, Igor
- Re: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Kazuho Oku
- Re: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Brian Trammell (IETF)
- Re: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Martin Thomson
- Re: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Brian Trammell (IETF)
- Re: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Kazuho Oku
- Grips in the Wire Image for In-Network State (was… Brian Trammell (IETF)
- Re: Grips in the Wire Image for In-Network State … Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Martin Thomson
- Re: Privacy holes Roland Zink
- Re: Grips in the Wire Image for In-Network State … Kazuho Oku
- Re: Grips in the Wire Image for In-Network State … Martin Thomson
- Re: Grips in the Wire Image for In-Network State … Brian Trammell (IETF)
- Re: Grips in the Wire Image for In-Network State … Brian Trammell (IETF)
- Re: Privacy holes Ian Swett
- Re: Grips in the Wire Image for In-Network State … Spencer Dawkins at IETF
- Re: Grips in the Wire Image for In-Network State … Kazuho Oku
- Re: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Kazuho Oku
- RE: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Praveen Balasubramanian
- RE: Grips in the Wire Image for In-Network State … Praveen Balasubramanian
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Mark Nottingham
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Brian Trammell (IETF)
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Ian Swett
- Bona fide loss measurement bits alexandre.ferrieux
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Roberto Peon
- Re: [Potential Spoof] Re: Getting to consensus on… Roberto Peon
- RE: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Praveen Balasubramanian
- Re: Privacy holes Christian Huitema
- RE: Privacy holes Praveen Balasubramanian
- Re: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Ian Swett
- Re: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Kazuho Oku
- Re: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Martin Thomson
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Mirja Kühlewind
- RE: Privacy holes (was: Re: Getting to consensus … Mike Bishop
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Roberto Peon
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Christian Huitema
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Kazuho Oku
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Christian Huitema
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Kazuho Oku
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Mark Nottingham
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Christian Huitema
- RE: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Deval, Manasi
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Jana Iyengar
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Ian Swett
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Kazuho Oku
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Christian Huitema
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- RE: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Mike Bishop
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Ian Swett
- RE: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Mike Bishop
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Ian Swett
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Kazuho Oku
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Erik Kline
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Kazuho Oku
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Patrick McManus
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Ian Swett
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Patrick McManus
- RE: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Lubashev, Igor
- RE: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Praveen Balasubramanian
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Kazuho Oku
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Brian Trammell (IETF)
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Jana Iyengar
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Martin Thomson
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Boris Pismenny
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Roberto Peon
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Christian Huitema
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Ian Swett
- RE: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Praveen Balasubramanian
- RE: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Lubashev, Igor
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Martin Thomson
- RE: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Praveen Balasubramanian
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Martin Thomson
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Benjamin Kaduk
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Salz, Rich
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Roberto Peon
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Spencer Dawkins at IETF
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Ted Hardie
- RE: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Praveen Balasubramanian
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Brian Trammell (IETF)
- RE: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Lubashev, Igor
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Ted Hardie
- RE: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Lubashev, Igor
- RE: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Praveen Balasubramanian
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Roberto Peon
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Roberto Peon
- Re: [Potential Spoof] Re: Getting to consensus on… Roberto Peon
- Re: [Potential Spoof] Re: Getting to consensus on… Jana Iyengar
- RE: [Potential Spoof] Re: Getting to consensus on… Praveen Balasubramanian
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Spencer Dawkins at IETF
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: [Potential Spoof] Re: Getting to consensus on… Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Benjamin Kaduk
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Ian Swett
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Mirja Kühlewind
- RE: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Roni Even (A)
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Dmitri Tikhonov
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Gorry Fairhurst
- RE: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Praveen Balasubramanian
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Christian Huitema
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Mikkel Fahnøe Jørgensen
- Re: Getting to consensus on packet number encrypt… Christian Huitema