Re: QUIC re-chartering: include DNS-over-QUIC?

Paul Vixie <paul@redbarn.org> Tue, 14 April 2020 03:01 UTC

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From: Paul Vixie <paul@redbarn.org>
To: Martin Thomson <mt@lowentropy.net>, quic@ietf.org
Cc: IETF QUIC WG <quic@ietf.org>, Erik Nygren <erik+ietf@nygren.org>
Subject: Re: QUIC re-chartering: include DNS-over-QUIC?
Date: Tue, 14 Apr 2020 03:01:29 +0000
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On Tuesday, 14 April 2020 02:55:31 UTC Erik Nygren wrote:
> Martin summarizes well below.  What changes things is the need for an
> encrypted+authenticated transport.

DNS has an authenticated transport -- SIG(0) -- which is rarely needed.

DNS has authentication end-to-end -- DNSSEC -- which is where it's needed.

DNS has an encrypted transport -- DoT.

> If we could stick with DNS-over-53 (TCP and UDP) then QUIC buys us
> nothing.  But if our choices are:
> 
> * DoH
> * DoTLS
> * DoDTLS
> * DoQUIC
> * Do{SomethingBespoke}
> 
> then from a large-scale server operator perspective DoQ has lots going for
> it. There was a good comparison of some of these for what they mean from a
> protocol stack elements perspective in DPRIVE.

i think it's clear you have all the excuses needed to drive DoQ. however, 
before you move on, remember that DNS has solved its own problems w/o QUIC, 
and QUIC's need for DNS is about something else than "large-scale operator 
perspective".

-- 
Paul