Re: [Resolverless-dns] Paper on Resolver-less DNS

Ted Lemon <> Fri, 16 August 2019 15:54 UTC

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From: Ted Lemon <>
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Date: Fri, 16 Aug 2019 11:54:10 -0400
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To: Steffen Nurpmeso <>
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Subject: Re: [Resolverless-dns] Paper on Resolver-less DNS
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DNSSEC lets you check that the cert you have been offered is for a key that the site actually uses. Of course DNSSEC can be blocked, but it can’t be blocked undetectably.  So with DNSSEC you can at least know that you are under attack and decide whether to proceed. 

It’s also true that sometimes state actors openly break PKI, and that we can’t do anything about that systemically. But when state actors or others secretly break PKI, having a way to detect that is very beneficial. 

Sent from my iPhone

> On Aug 16, 2019, at 11:25, Steffen Nurpmeso <> wrote:
> Ted Lemon wrote in <>:
> |Both of those papers talk about incompetence of operation, not about \
> |technical weaknesses. Competently operated DNSSEC will not have the \
> |problems these two papers describe. Are you aware of any technical \
> |problem with using TLSA to prevent PKI attacks, or is this just FUD?
> Competence does not help if governments or companies enforce some
> policy.  If they are willing to channel data and require
> installation of a certificate in your CA pool, then the best you
> can get is increased effort on their side, by introducing a shadow
> DNS topology, unless i am mistaken.
> I do not understand, and never (~18 years) did, why the complexity
> of DNS is increased so much; instead of moving over to secure
> transport that is.  And if you want to sign data bundles, then
> those keys could also be used, they have the potential for it, do
> they.  Repeatedly connect up to the root domain of your URL in
> question, and collect certificates along the way, unless you have
> the complete chain, which you can cache locally.  Especially if
> you now even pump the data as such over an already open HTTP
> channel.  But in general this looked to me the much more elegant
> resolution (once i looked at DNSSEC and TSIG and said "no
> (hopefully not)").  And much easier to implement, and by using
> facilities of libraries which see many eyes.  And keeping the core
> protocol clean.
> What do you win more than (possibly) increased complexity on the
> door through the wall?  But "leaving lonely people fight in dark
> side streets as opposed to perceptable noise when someone enforces
> entries in local CA pools"?
> Just my one cent.
> --steffen
> |
> |Der Kragenbaer,                The moon bear,
> |der holt sich munter           he cheerfully and one by one
> |einen nach dem anderen runter  wa.ks himself off
> |(By Robert Gernhardt)