Re: [Resolverless-dns] Paper on Resolver-less DNS

Erik Sy <sy@informatik.uni-hamburg.de> Sun, 25 August 2019 20:40 UTC

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To: Eric Osterweil <lists@osterweil.net>
Cc: resolverless-dns@ietf.org
References: <CAHbrMsBhR1yaLxQk7wZk54Jdf5nvkS03KC3UTae0Famu2+SV8g@mail.gmail.com> <4568720.uvMTqBdgP4@linux-9daj> <fb12f102-714d-95cc-c6cc-0871a2df9f50@informatik.uni-hamburg.de> <34813218.VKkrhzyXsx@linux-9daj> <ae355776-a1bb-cf23-f380-133439661d1f@informatik.uni-hamburg.de> <1171283855.590.1566558699991@appsuite-gw1.open-xchange.com> <a8d9398b-4fea-0a1e-3fa7-5954d001f9ea@informatik.uni-hamburg.de> <1405682425.665.1566561941610@appsuite-gw1.open-xchange.com> <220061a8-608c-0a87-4656-213c87979284@informatik.uni-hamburg.de> <849BE7D4-A07E-496B-B413-E1C979390DA8@osterweil.net>
From: Erik Sy <sy@informatik.uni-hamburg.de>
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Date: Sun, 25 Aug 2019 22:40:50 +0200
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Subject: Re: [Resolverless-dns] Paper on Resolver-less DNS
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On 8/25/19 20:03, Eric Osterweil wrote:
>>
>> Additional pinning of certificates provides the benefit that an
>> illegitimate certificate can be detected during the server
>> authentication. Note, that CT can detect this only in the aftermath. As
>> a drawback of pinning, a misconfiguration of this mechanism always leads
>> to a fatal error. The trade-off at hand is catching misbehaving CAs
>> before the connection establishment and accepting hard failures due to
>> possible misconfiguration versus catching the malicious CA only in the
>> aftermath of the connection establishment. I think that Chrome decided
>> for the latter one.
>
> If I follow your logic here, then I think this is a statement that is
> at least break-even for (but likely actually in favor of) DANE.  If a
> certificate that is proffered over a TCP connection does not match the
> TLSA record, it is proactively detected and the session initiation
> fails, yes?
>
Here is a quote from Chris Palmer on this issue[1]:

"The strength of PKP ― run-time enforcement with hard-fail — is also
exactly its weakness. Some people are OK with the risk, but overall I
think the market has spoken: HPKP has seen close to no adoption. People
don't want to brick their sites.

As for DANE, it would at best have the same strength/weakness of HPKP,
but with the additional problems of DNSSEC."

In total, it seems like Chrome does not want to deploy DANE.
Erik

1:
https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/forum/#!msg/blink-dev/he9tr7p3rZ8/eNMwKPmUBAAJ