Re: [SECMECH] Framework Bindings Vs. Mechanism Bridges

[Charles Clancy <[e-mail]>]

Bernard Aboba wrote:
 >>Does tunnelling various other weak mechanisms over TLS meet said
 >>criteria?
 >
 >
 > If "weak" means mechanisms that do not generate a key (e.g.
 > MD5-Challenge), then these would violate RFC 4017 mandatory
 > requirement 6:
 >
 >    [6]  Protection against man-in-the-middle attacks.  This
 >         corresponds
 >         to the "Cryptographic binding", "Integrity protection",
 >         "Replay protection", and "Session independence" security
 >         claims defined in [RFC3748], Section 7.2.1.

I guess there are two points of view -- one where the AP is the service, 
and one where the EAP server is the service.

If the EAP server is the service, then it can do a passthrough Kerberos 
authentication for the EAP client.  The client can obtain a TGT and a 
service ticket for the EAP server, and then authenticate to the EAP 
server using the service ticket.  The key contained within that service 
ticket is known only by the client and the EAP server, so it could 
theoretically then be used to bootstrap an EAP key derivation, including 
the info needed by TTLS to do the crypto binding.  TTLS would then 
augment the security of these keys using its own entropy, and poof.

... or am I missing something?

[ t. charles clancy ]--[ [e-mail] ]--[ www.cs.umd.edu/~clancy ]
[ computer science ]-----[ university of maryland | college park ]

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