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Re: [TLS] About encrypting SNI

mrex@sap.com (Martin Rex) Tue, 15 April 2014 16:54 UTC

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To: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
Date: Tue, 15 Apr 2014 18:54:45 +0200
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Subject: Re: [TLS] About encrypting SNI
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Salz, Rich wrote:
>
> Yes, you have it right.  Alyssa's concerns about DNS are valid,
> but I do wonder if the CNAME security requirements are any different
> than the A/AAAA security requirements; I need to think about it.

Both have no security requirements for HTTP-over-TLS.

The way that HTTP-over-TLS was originally designed, it was without
trust into DNS, i.e. *NONE* of the transformations that happen
during DNS lookup (CNAME, A/AAAA) affect the processing of the
server endpoint identification.  (SMTP got it wrong)

-Martin

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