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Re: [TLS] About encrypting SNI

"Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com> Tue, 13 May 2014 17:56 UTC

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From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
To: Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>, Erik Nygren <erik+ietf@nygren.org>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Date: Tue, 13 May 2014 13:56:15 -0400
Thread-Topic: [TLS] About encrypting SNI
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Subject: Re: [TLS] About encrypting SNI
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> The TLS WG needs to fix the SNI leak, and DNS confidentiality needs to be addressed by the DNS folks if we want to protect this information against passive eavesdropping.

I've already written why I think encrypting SNI is not worth the trade-offs.  Yoav, I think, added the point that the traffic analysis will give it away, anyway.

It hurts more than it helps.

	/r$

--  
Principal Security Engineer
Akamai Technologies, Cambridge, MA
IM: rsalz@jabber.me; Twitter: RichSalz

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