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Re: [TLS] About encrypting SNI

"Sniffen, Brian" <bsniffen@akamai.com> Thu, 17 April 2014 16:36 UTC

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From: "Sniffen, Brian" <bsniffen@akamai.com>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Date: Thu, 17 Apr 2014 12:35:59 -0400
Thread-Topic: [TLS] About encrypting SNI
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Subject: Re: [TLS] About encrypting SNI
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On Apr 17, 2014, at 9:52 AM, "Andy Lutomirski" <luto@amacapital.net> wrote:
> 
> , Bob can decrypt it in time t(N), and an eavesdropper
> who does not know any of the private keys can't distinguish the
> message from random?

Surely the eavesdropper can measure the decryption delay, probe himself, and discover which key it was---unless every implementation carefully shuffles keys?

And now an adversary can cause N decryptions per initiated connection. Ouch.

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