Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3

Dan Brown <danibrown@blackberry.com> Fri, 23 September 2016 15:14 UTC

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From: Dan Brown <danibrown@blackberry.com>
To: 'Hugo Krawczyk' <hugo@ee.technion.ac.il>, BITS Security <BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
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Date: Fri, 23 Sep 2016 15:14:33 +0000
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
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Weaker crypto to stop insider attacks, is that the request? (And practice?) Doesn’t that increase the risk of larger (but perhaps rarer) further insider attacks?

From: TLS [mailto:tls-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Hugo Krawczyk
Sent: Thursday, September 22, 2016 7:41 PM
To: BITS Security <BITSSecurity@fsroundtable.org>;
Cc: tls@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3

If the problem is the use of forward secrecy then there is a simple solution, don't use it.