Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3 (Martin Rex) Wed, 28 September 2016 09:01 UTC

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To: Judson Wilson <>
Date: Wed, 28 Sep 2016 11:01:43 +0200
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
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Judson Wilson wrote:
> I think this challenge is best solved by putting the information on the
> wire in some way, possibly as a special industry-specific extension (used
> only by those who are bent on shooting themselves in the foot). The benefit
> being that if the TLS channel is alive, the session information is
> available to the monitor.  Just as a strawman, the client could transmit
> session info in special records, encrypted by a public key, and the
> monitoring equipment could scoop these up. For compatibility with servers
> outside the network, a middlebox could somehow filter out these records.
> It sounds like the need is large enough that such an effort is feasible,
> and it would be good to keep normal TLS 1.3 unambiguously forward secure.
> (There IS still the question of how to make sure that the extension is not
> enabled in endpoints it shouldn't be.)

Whoa there.  What you're describing is essentially the
Clipper-Chip & Skipjack encryption

I'm sorry, but the IETF decided back then that it doesn't want
to standardize such technology:

I'm sorry, but I'm still violently opposed to the IETF endorsing
backdooring of security protocols.