Re: [TLS] call for consensus: changes to IANA registry rules for cipher suites

[Phil Lello <[e-mail]>]

>
> >> Usually what happens is the server generates a self-signed certificate
> >> and the apps are given some "username" and "password" and the app
> >> ignores the unauthenticated nature of the TLS connection and sends
> >> the u/p credential on through.
> >
> > Isn't this use case more of an argument for an updated auth-digest to use
> > something better than MD5? I'm not convinced MITM is a real concern for a
> > typical IoT environment (however that's defined - I'm assuming http in a
> > domestic environment).
>
>   First of all, what makes you think it's MD5 digest and not just
> plaintext? And updated by whom? These are ad hoc constructions done
> because the alternative is too onerous.
>

I didn't say that. I was suggesting using a standard HTTP digest mechanism
rather than sending a plaintext username/password. The IETF has already
updated HTTP digest, so there's no work.

>
>   As someone who has stolen wi-fi from the apt next door that was
> protected by a PSK I would say that doing a dictionary attack in
> a "domestic environment" is entirely plausible. If I have to do a
> soft AP advertising the neighbor's SSID in order to lure a set-top
> box or thermostat or whatever to connect to me then that's a very
> low bar.
>

Whilst you have my sympathy, I don't see how that's relevant; a dictionary
attack can be used just as easily against a TLS protected resource.
Securing the WiFi configuration so that devices connect to the correct one
is not a TLS issue.

Best wishes,

Phil Lello