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Re: [TLS] call for consensus: changes to IANA registry rules for cipher suites

Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net> Wed, 30 March 2016 16:05 UTC

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From: Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>
To: Benjamin Kaduk <bkaduk@akamai.com>, Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com>, "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] call for consensus: changes to IANA registry rules for cipher suites
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On Wed 2016-03-30 11:33:09 -0400, Benjamin Kaduk wrote:
> I am not sure that we want to be in the business of explicitly marking
> things as insecure other than our own RFCs, though -- there could be an
> implication of more review than is actually the case, which is what this
> proposal is trying to get rid of.

I think i agree with Ben here: if we have a tri-state:
approved/not-approved/known-bad, then the people will infer that the
not-approved ciphersuites are better than the known-bad ones, which
isn't necessarily the case.

I think i'd rather see it stay at "approved/not-approved"

      --dkg

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