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Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3

Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> Mon, 26 September 2016 23:22 UTC

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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Mon, 26 Sep 2016 16:21:53 -0700
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
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On Mon, Sep 26, 2016 at 4:09 PM, Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org>
wrote:
>
> There are other ways to accomplish this.  For example, the server might
> use session ticket keys that are stored centrally encrypted under a
> suitable escrow key.  If clients always enable session tickets, then
> every handshake will result in the server returning a session ticket,
> in which case the session can be later decrypted if the session ticket
> keys are available.
>

This actually doesn't work in TLS 1.3 because the resumption master secret
is not sufficient to decrypt the connection in which it was established.

-Ekr

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