Re: [TLS] Consensus Call on MTI Algorithms

Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com> Thu, 02 April 2015 19:09 UTC

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Date: Thu, 2 Apr 2015 14:09:07 -0500
From: Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com>
To: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Consensus Call on MTI Algorithms
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On Thu, Apr 02, 2015 at 06:59:11PM +0000, Salz, Rich wrote:
> It's reasonably easy to add ciphers.  Especially since most TLS 1.3
> implementations will be built on a 1.[012] codebase. 
> 
> It is nearly impossible to remove ciphers.

If *all* clients and servers implement the same required N>1 algorithms,
then removing one is possible when you still have at least one of those
remaining.  Things get dicey when you're out of required algorithms and
you need to prefer less-universal recommended algorithms, or if not all
implementations adhere to the requirements.

Now, if requiring 3 algorithms turns out to be a joke because some
implementors will ignore one, and others another, then 3 would be a very
bad number indeed; 4 would be worse.  We do have to consider how likely
this is; 3 will be more costly than 2, no doubt, and that may be enough.

> Because of this, I am strongly in favor of JUST TWO.

I can get on board with two, but then I'd want AES-128-GCM and
ChaCha20-Poly1305.  I think having two very different algorithms is a
big plus.

Nico
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