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Re: [TLS] Consensus Call on MTI Algorithms

Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com> Fri, 03 April 2015 18:09 UTC

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From: Russ Housley <housley@vigilsec.com>
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Date: Fri, 03 Apr 2015 14:09:02 -0400
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To: Dave Garrett <davemgarrett@gmail.com>
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Cc: tls@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [TLS] Consensus Call on MTI Algorithms
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>>> I would like at least two modes for AES to be required: one AEAD
>>> (probably GCM) and one AEAD-by-generic-construction (e.g., using HMAC).
>> 
>> OCB is a better fit constrained devices. CCM requires two passes.
> 
> So, at this point in the discussion, this is sounding like what might get closer to agreement:
> 
> o Symmetric:
>        MUST AES-OCB 128 (or 256?)

The patent uncertainty prevents me from supporting this approach.  I'd need to see IPR disclosures from all three patent holders before revisiting  this as a MTI algorithm.

I am not opposed to assigning a code point for AES-OCB at any key size now.

Russ

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