Re: [TLS] Consensus Call on MTI Algorithms

Yaron Sheffer <yaronf.ietf@gmail.com> Thu, 02 April 2015 12:45 UTC

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Date: Thu, 02 Apr 2015 04:50:30 -0700
From: Yaron Sheffer <yaronf.ietf@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Consensus Call on MTI Algorithms
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> On 1 April 2015 at 17:46, Yaron Sheffer <yaronf.ietf@gmail.com> wrote:
>> AES-256-GCM and SHA-384. Doesn't it make sense to have them as SHOULD,
>
> I don't see much point.  All involved likely know if they need
> something that strong, which is way down there in the "we might need
> it someday" category [1].
>
> [1] http://www.keylength.com/en/3/
>

The TLS BCP is IETF consensus, not just one person's opinion. If people 
deploy stuff based on our recommendations, we should ensure that it is 
still available to them when they migrate to TLS 1.3.

Thanks,
	Yaron