Re: [TLS] Consensus Call on MTI Algorithms

You mandated AES-GCM with 128-bit key. Would it be a burden to add 256-bit key support for the algorithm you have to have anyway? 

Why not add AES-GCM-256 as SHOULD? 

--
Regards,
Uri Blumenthal                            Voice: (781) 981-1638
Cyber Systems and Technology   Fax:   (781) 981-0186
MIT Lincoln Laboratory                Cell:  (339) 223-5363
244 Wood Street, Lexington, MA 02420-9185       

Web:  http://www.ll.mit.edu/CST/
MIT LL Root CA:  <https://www.ll.mit.edu/labcertificateauthority.html>

----- Original Message -----
From: Yaron Sheffer [mailto:yaronf.ietf@gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, April 02, 2015 08:52 AM
To: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>; Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
Cc: tls@ietf.org <tls@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Consensus Call on MTI Algorithms

On 04/02/2015 05:48 AM, Stephen Farrell wrote:
>
>
> On 02/04/15 12:50, Yaron Sheffer wrote:
>>> On 1 April 2015 at 17:46, Yaron Sheffer <yaronf.ietf@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>> AES-256-GCM and SHA-384. Doesn't it make sense to have them as SHOULD,
>>>
>>> I don't see much point.  All involved likely know if they need
>>> something that strong, which is way down there in the "we might need
>>> it someday" category [1].
>>>
>>> [1] http://www.keylength.com/en/3/
>>>
>>
>> The TLS BCP is IETF consensus, not just one person's opinion. If people
>> deploy stuff based on our recommendations, we should ensure that it is
>> still available to them when they migrate to TLS 1.3.
>
> But isn't it likely we revise the TLS BCP once TLS1.3 is done and
> implementations start to become common? We can make sure things
> all add up at that point in time, and are in-whack with what people
> are deploying, but we don't necessarily need to do so now I think.
>

It entirely likely. But even then, I am not sure we'll be able to 
convince people who went to AES-256 (presumably, for "compliance" 
reasons) to move to ChaCha. And certainly not to AES-128...

_______________________________________________
TLS mailing list
TLS@ietf.org
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls