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Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3

Ryan Carboni <ryacko@gmail.com> Tue, 18 October 2016 18:08 UTC

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From: Ryan Carboni <ryacko@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 18 Oct 2016 11:07:31 -0700
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To: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
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On Sat, Oct 1, 2016 at 4:23 AM, Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
wrote:

> Ryan Carboni <ryacko@gmail.com> writes:
>
> >I've never quite understood what TLS was supposed to be protecting
> against,
> >and whether or not it has done so successfully, or has the potential to
> do so
> >successfully.
>
> It's the Inside-Out Thread Model (also shared by a number of other security
> protocols, it's not just TLS), "our defence is SSL/TLS/IPsec/PKI/…  and our
> threat model is whatever that happens to defend against".  DNSSEC is a
> classic
> example of this, the DNSSEC requirements doc was published *a decade* after
> DNSSEC itself.  Mind you, other protocols are still waiting for their
> requirements doc to be published.  PKIX specifically actively declined to
> consider use cases because heck, this is a standards committee dammit, we
> can't be expected to take into account what people want to do with it.
>
> Mind you, in the absence of any success criteria, no-one can say you've
> failed...
>
> Peter.



It is worth reading this paper apparently from 2010 on reusing ephemeral
keys:

https://www.math.uwaterloo.ca/~ajmeneze/publications/ephemeral.pdf

Regardless, I can hope the Snowden disclosures will force people into
action.

But please.

Continue to make the internet secure.

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