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Re: [tsvwg] Gorry Fairhurst Individual thoughts on choosing whether/how to advance ECN work.

Paul Vixie <paul@redbarn.org> Fri, 15 May 2020 20:50 UTC

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From: Paul Vixie <paul@redbarn.org>
To: Joseph Touch <touch@strayalpha.com>, tsvwg@ietf.org
Cc: Gorry Fairhurst <gorry@erg.abdn.ac.uk>, "tsvwg@ietf.org" <tsvwg@ietf.org>, Jonathan Morton <chromatix99@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 15 May 2020 20:48:59 +0000
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Subject: Re: [tsvwg] Gorry Fairhurst Individual thoughts on choosing whether/how to advance ECN work.
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On Friday, 15 May 2020 20:38:20 UTC Jonathan Morton wrote:
> ...
> Under the assumption that everybody lies, RFC-3168 ECN is itself pretty
> useless.  But it is used and useful in practice, so the underlying
> assumption that everyone lies should be re-examined.  The non-deployment
> and ultimate retirement of Nonce Sum lends evidence to this viewpoint.

"nothing which can be abused won't be" is my formulation of choice these days.

> Under the weaker assumption that everybody *can* lie but would only do so
> given some incentive, I believe SCE is not only safe but remains useful in
> most circumstances.
> 
> Under this same weaker assumption, L4S is neither safe nor useful in my
> opinion.

i don't know enough to speak to the utility question. but if asymmetry in 
risk:benefit is to be our guide, i agree it would lead ECT(1) as an output.

-- 
Paul

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