Re: [Tsvwg] Adopting draft-behringer-tsvwg-rsvp-security-groupkeying as WG item?

[Hannes Tschofenig <[e-mail]>]

I think that the scope of the document should be the following:

* Describe what the problem is (largely known already)
* Describe the deployment scenarios where this is a problem (not every 
possible deployment combination of RSVP is really useful in the 
real-world; in fact I would even argue the other way around). In some 
other groups in the Transport Area Lars and Magnus have been very keen 
on investigating whether there is a relevance for deployment....
* Illustrate the requirements and assumptions for solutions for the 
deployment scenarios that are seen as relevant.

If it only motivates a specific solution proposal then you could just 
merge it with the solution and use it as a motivation section for the 
solution spec.

Ciao
Hannes

Brian Weis wrote:
> Hi Lars,
>
> On Jan 29, 2008, at 2:05 AM, Lars Eggert wrote:
>
>> Hi, Brian,
>>
>> On 2008-1-28, at 19:58, ext Brian Weis wrote:
>>> Calling draft-behringer-tsvwg a "survey" of "group keying for RSVP" 
>>> isn't an entirely accurate statement. It's a much more fundamental 
>>> description of RSVP security: it documents the RSVP trust model 
>>> (perhaps for the first time), and from there it describes the 
>>> appropriate uses for RSVP keys that should be used within different 
>>> network topologies, as well as provisioning methods for those keys. 
>>> Although these topics don't motivate new TSVWG protocol development, 
>>> taking ownership of these RSVP security fundamentals is important 
>>> for TSVWG. I believe that is a good rationale for accepting 
>>> draft-behringer-tsvwg as a WG item.
>>
>> I agree with you, and I said during the Vancouver meeting that I'd 
>> see such an Informational document in scope for TSVWG.
>>
>> However, I'm now hesitating, because I've heard the argument being 
>> made (both in Vancouver during SAAG and in the recent email by 
>> Francois) that the acceptance of 
>> draft-behringer-tsvwg-rsvp-security-groupkeying as a TSVWG work item 
>> would establish a need to work on a solution in MSEC (based on 
>> draft-weis-gdoi-for-rsvp). I don't agree with this argument. At best, 
>> the document would identify a hole in the solution space, and if MSEC 
>> wants to fill that, I'd need to find its own motivation for doing so.
>
> I certainly agree that the action of TSVWG accepting 
> draft-behringer-tsvwg-rsvp-security-groupkeying as a WG document can't 
> dictate any particular action to MSEC. But such a TWVWG document 
> describing a group security model for RSVP does provide MSEC with the 
> basis for considering protocol work that increases the overall level 
> of security when group keys are used.
>
> On the other hand, rejecting it sends a message to MSEC that the use 
> of group security isn't particularly valuable for RSVP and so there 
> isn't much point in doing addition protocol work to make the group 
> security model more secure.
>
> Thanks,
> Brian
>
>> Lars
>