Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architecture?
Fabien Imbault <fabien.imbault@gmail.com> Wed, 24 March 2021 21:20 UTC
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References: <CANYRo8jBZFVWyvAgVSWSmnuC+i1NaEkJEGWextzGB0xNFnD9fA@mail.gmail.com> <20210321171800.GT79563@kduck.mit.edu> <6772CFFC-7411-4BBE-948B-8271654C0FE9@mit.edu> <CANYRo8gMQYJXcb0FU2VCVcdbBLsopZ5Wfyo3hd1Pd5tmOSs0SA@mail.gmail.com> <953A4B2A-6064-4E16-A6FA-B97FBE770B11@mit.edu> <CANYRo8iPeeM3rLP9BYid2B71NzU7fR6J9Ra4=PSODTFE7i75Zg@mail.gmail.com> <CEECEE23-24D0-4C0C-B39E-9FDFF9E1E13D@mit.edu> <CANpA1Z2S8Y3+U+jOa-ZbTzsZ9hkybCnGfzx0kP8VF=Z=Se4uew@mail.gmail.com> <CAM8feuTaYEZY8BNtp5j8dAxZjBLnM-0CZQUO9UgGAAx=-qQyJA@mail.gmail.com> <CANpA1Z2Zt0ksRZqu7f6kGc5CXvWjRvuBMyDn4-EeiVE7Ndj3yw@mail.gmail.com> <CAM8feuRk6bB6ry1dy9W-9OKSgckYqicVtQ7jsrxseA2iJQdPKQ@mail.gmail.com> <CANpA1Z2__Y2UiQ-x_Fz4Q05guFhi-rOygJ+pHkNjbRUdh2Y97Q@mail.gmail.com>
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From: Fabien Imbault <fabien.imbault@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 24 Mar 2021 22:20:29 +0100
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To: Alan Karp <alanhkarp@gmail.com>
Cc: Justin Richer <jricher@mit.edu>, Adrian Gropper <agropper@healthurl.com>, Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>, Mark Miller <erights@gmail.com>, GNAP Mailing List <txauth@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architecture?
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Isn't that what the AS is supposed to be, only with the caveat that the policy is defined locally? Fabien Le mer. 24 mars 2021 à 20:17, Alan Karp <alanhkarp@gmail.com> a écrit : > AS-RO is an AS that RO trusts to delegate RO's access tokens according to > RO's policies. > > -------------- > Alan Karp > > > On Wed, Mar 24, 2021 at 9:36 AM Fabien Imbault <fabien.imbault@gmail.com> > wrote: > >> Hi Alan and Adrian, >> >> I've created issue AS-RO policy delegation ( >> https://github.com/ietf-wg-gnap/gnap-core-protocol/issues/223) to >> capture your input. >> A first question that arises: can we give a definition to AS-RO? >> >> Thanks >> Fabien >> >> On Tue, Mar 23, 2021 at 4:15 PM Alan Karp <alanhkarp@gmail.com> wrote: >> >>> Fabien Imbault <fabien.imbault@gmail.com> wrote: >>> >>>> Hi Alan, >>>> >>>> Yes, but in that flow, the token relationship between AS-RS and AS-RO >>>> is only secure if the tokens issued by AS-RS are cryptographically >>>> attenuable in the first place. >>>> >>> >>> Attenuated delegation is a requirement, but that doesn't have to be done >>> cryptographically. Token exchange works just fine. SPKI and zcap-ld are >>> examples of the crypto approach, and we used token exchange in the system >>> for HP. >>> >>> -------------- >>> Alan Karp >>> >>> >>> On Tue, Mar 23, 2021 at 4:12 AM Fabien Imbault <fabien.imbault@gmail.com> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> Hi Alan, >>>> >>>> Yes, but in that flow, the token relationship between AS-RS and AS-RO >>>> is only secure if the tokens issued by AS-RS are cryptographically >>>> attenuable in the first place. >>>> >>>> Fabien >>>> >>>> On Mon, Mar 22, 2021 at 9:26 PM Alan Karp <alanhkarp@gmail.com> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Justin Richer <jricher@mit.edu> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> But with all that in mind, I think the key here is going to be >>>>>> looking at what the inputs to the AS are, and how those can be defined in >>>>>> an interoperable way for AS’s that can accept them. I think there’s a lot >>>>>> of room for innovation and flexibility here that doesn’t break the trust >>>>>> model or core use cases. If I have an AS-RS set that won’t accept my >>>>>> favorite flavor of policy engine inputs, then I can decide not to use that >>>>>> one. But this is a very different question than saying the RS itself needs >>>>>> to accept my own AS — and we can’t keep conflating these two models. >>>>>> >>>>>> I agree. The point of having an AS-RO is to allow RO to specify a >>>>> policy for which of RO's access tokens should be delegated under what >>>>> conditions. AS-RS should not need to understand those policies. The flow >>>>> would be >>>>> >>>>> - RO contacts AS-RS and gets one or more access tokens. >>>>> - RO delegates one or more of those tokens, potentially >>>>> sub-scoped, to AS-RO. >>>>> - A different user contacts AS-RO to get a potentially sub-scoped >>>>> access token from AS-RO. >>>>> - That user presents the access token delegated by AS-RO when >>>>> invoking the resource. >>>>> >>>>> AS-RS only needs to verify that the delegation chain is legitimate, >>>>> e.g., no increase in scope, and that it grants permission for the request >>>>> being made. AS-RS does not need to understand the policy behind granting >>>>> the delegation by AS-RO. >>>>> >>>>> -------------- >>>>> Alan Karp >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Mon, Mar 22, 2021 at 11:40 AM Justin Richer <jricher@mit.edu> >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Adrian, >>>>>> >>>>>> I think this shows the problem with the terminology as it’s been >>>>>> applied in this conversation, which I’ve tried to shine light on before. >>>>>> What you and others are calling the “RS” is really the “AS and RS working >>>>>> together” — everything to the right of the line. When Denis had brought up >>>>>> “eliminating the AS” in another thread, what he’d really done is labeled >>>>>> everything to the right of the line as the “RS”. Of course, the irony here >>>>>> is that everything to the right of the line used all be called the “AS” or >>>>>> simply “server” in the OAuth 1 days. As you say below, I don’t want the >>>>>> client to have visibility on what happens on that side. >>>>>> >>>>>> Note well: The Google+ logo labeled “IdP” in the diagram is not the >>>>>> AS, as far as GNAP is concerned. It does not issue an access token that the >>>>>> RS will accept. The elements to the left of the line could be a lot of >>>>>> things, but they are NOT the AS — by definition. The client lives over on >>>>>> the left, but so do any external inputs to the AS. These could be policy >>>>>> inputs on behalf of the RO, they could be presentation artifacts, they >>>>>> could be federated logins, they could be the output of policy decisions. >>>>>> How the AS comes to trust those things is up to the AS’s implementation. >>>>>> It’s something we can talk about, but ultimately GNAP won’t be in any >>>>>> position to dictate because in practice some AS’s are simply going to >>>>>> internalize all policies and we will never successfully force those open. >>>>>> >>>>>> But with all that in mind, I think the key here is going to be >>>>>> looking at what the inputs to the AS are, and how those can be defined in >>>>>> an interoperable way for AS’s that can accept them. I think there’s a lot >>>>>> of room for innovation and flexibility here that doesn’t break the trust >>>>>> model or core use cases. If I have an AS-RS set that won’t accept my >>>>>> favorite flavor of policy engine inputs, then I can decide not to use that >>>>>> one. But this is a very different question than saying the RS itself needs >>>>>> to accept my own AS — and we can’t keep conflating these two models. >>>>>> >>>>>> So to me, GNAP can support a Zero Trust Architecture by LEVERAGING >>>>>> the AS, not by subsuming or eliminating it. It is in fact the AS, not the >>>>>> client and not the RS, that will request and consume the results of a >>>>>> privacy-preserving zero-trust policy query thing. Anything that happens >>>>>> downstream from that is of little concern to the zero-trust components >>>>>> because, as you point out, it’s on the “other side” of the line. >>>>>> >>>>>> I think we got this basic component model pretty right in OAuth: the >>>>>> AS and RS and client working together. Where OAuth misses the mark is the >>>>>> assumption that the user has to log in to the AS through a webpage and >>>>>> interact directly, thereby proving they’re the RO. It’s this latter space >>>>>> where I think we can both push innovation and also address the important >>>>>> and compelling use cases like the ones you’re bringing. >>>>>> >>>>>> — Justin >>>>>> >>>>>> On Mar 22, 2021, at 2:14 PM, Adrian Gropper <agropper@healthurl.com> >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> I'm sorry, Justin. As a Resource Owner, I look at the RS trust >>>>>> boundary (the dotted line in the diagram) as being the RS. I don't expect >>>>>> any visibility into what's going on on the right. >>>>>> >>>>>> My problem with the framing you propose is that requests are going to >>>>>> the RS (or the AS-RS) and I don't want to share my policies with the AS-RS. >>>>>> I want to keep the RS and AS-RS as ignorant as possible. >>>>>> >>>>>> Adrian >>>>>> >>>>>> On Mon, Mar 22, 2021 at 1:48 PM Justin Richer <jricher@mit.edu> >>>>>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> Adrian, >>>>>>> >>>>>>> What you’re discussing below, in terms of logging in to a site, is >>>>>>> not approaching the RS. You are in fact approaching the client, and >>>>>>> identifying both the AS and RS to the client. The client is a client *of >>>>>>> your identity* in this model, and the RS is part of the identity >>>>>>> provider. It’s really important that we don’t conflate the RS and client in >>>>>>> this way as it leads to a lot of confusion downstream and a lot of broken >>>>>>> trust boundaries. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> With that model in mind, approaching the “RS" and providing it your >>>>>>> identity is really just a case of the “federated login to AS” pattern that >>>>>>> we discussed on the WG call. The user here approaches an RS, which has its >>>>>>> own AS. To share things from this RS, the RO has to authenticate to the >>>>>>> RS’s AS. This particular AS allows the RO to do so using an external >>>>>>> identity — in which case, the AS is now a “client” of a separate, >>>>>>> disconnected (but layered) delegation. The ultimate client that eventually >>>>>>> calls the RS down the way may or may not know about these layers. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> <PastedGraphic-1.png> >>>>>>> This same AS, which is closely tied to the RS and trusted by the RS, >>>>>>> might also take in FIDO credentials, or DIDs, or any number of other proof >>>>>>> mechanisms. The output of this is an access token the RS trusts, but the >>>>>>> input is up to the AS. The RS is not what you’re logging in to. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> — Justin >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Mar 22, 2021, at 1:28 PM, Adrian Gropper <agropper@healthurl.com> >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I too am in favor of avoiding consolidation and correlation. Right >>>>>>> now, when I approach a service provider (RS) for the first time, I'm >>>>>>> offered the opportunity to identify my persona as: email, sign-in with >>>>>>> Google, Facebook, or Apple. I know there are people who try to create >>>>>>> one-off email addresses but that is mostly a waste of time. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> So, along come FIDO2 and DID wallets to the rescue. Now, in theory, >>>>>>> I have a way to start out my RS relationship pseudonymously. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> When I want my resource to be discovered or shared I will post that >>>>>>> RS URL including my pseudonym. If I then want to introduce a mediator in >>>>>>> front of my AS or messaging service endpoint, I have that option. If I want >>>>>>> to keep requests away from the mediator, I would publish an encryption key >>>>>>> along with my pseudonym. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> - Adrian >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> On Mon, Mar 22, 2021 at 9:55 AM Justin Richer <jricher@mit.edu> >>>>>>> wrote: >>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On Mar 21, 2021, at 1:18 PM, Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> wrote: >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > On Sat, Mar 20, 2021 at 01:07:42AM -0400, Adrian Gropper wrote: >>>>>>>> >> @Alan Karp <alanhkarp@gmail.com> shared a talk about the >>>>>>>> Principle Of Least >>>>>>>> >> Authority (POLA) in a recent comment >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> https://github.com/ietf-wg-gnap/gnap-core-protocol/issues/145#issuecomment-803099693 >>>>>>>> >> I recommend it. >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> We might expect a protocol with authorization in the title to >>>>>>>> use authority >>>>>>>> >> as a core principle. I advocate for a GNAP design that maximizes >>>>>>>> the power >>>>>>>> >> of the RO, to be seen as a human rights issue when the RO is a >>>>>>>> human. This >>>>>>>> >> causes me to ask how to combine better security with better >>>>>>>> human rights in >>>>>>>> >> GNAP. >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> Who should have the least authority in the GNAP design? >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> The AS derives authority as a delegate of the RO. If we ask the >>>>>>>> RO to >>>>>>>> >> partition limited authority across dozens of different ASs by >>>>>>>> domain and >>>>>>>> >> function, then we are not using technology to empower the >>>>>>>> individual. >>>>>>>> >> Probably the opposite, as we introduce consent fatigue and >>>>>>>> burden normal >>>>>>>> >> people to partition their lives into non-overlapping domains. >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> >> My experience says we should aim for one AS per persona because >>>>>>>> that maps >>>>>>>> >> into the way we manage our public and private identities. POLA >>>>>>>> would then >>>>>>>> >> teach care in keeping ASs and RSs related to work / public >>>>>>>> separate from >>>>>>>> >> ASs and RSs related to private life so that a policy >>>>>>>> vulnerability in our >>>>>>>> >> delegation to an AS would have the least likelihood of harm. >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> > Thinking about how least authority/least privilege would apply to >>>>>>>> GNAP >>>>>>>> > seems like a useful exercise. I do want to point out some >>>>>>>> potential >>>>>>>> > pitfalls with one-AS-per-persona that we can also be aware of. If >>>>>>>> > one-AS-per-persona becomes one-persona-per-AS as well, then the >>>>>>>> AS's >>>>>>>> > identity in effect also serves as a persona identity and there >>>>>>>> are privacy >>>>>>>> > considerations to that. If, on the other hand, the >>>>>>>> > multiple-personas-per-AS (presumably corresponding to multiple >>>>>>>> humans) >>>>>>>> > route is taken, we should consider whether that would lead to >>>>>>>> various >>>>>>>> > (e.g., market) forces driving consolidation to just a handful of >>>>>>>> > super-popular AS services. That topic is a current matter of >>>>>>>> concern to >>>>>>>> > some IETF participants. >>>>>>>> > >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> Hi Ben, big +1 to this. This is something that we discussed ages >>>>>>>> ago in the UMA working group, and it’s one of the biggest problems with the >>>>>>>> personal AS (and personal data store) model. This kind of thing makes >>>>>>>> RS-first trust models really difficult in practice. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> As a strawman, let’s say that I’ve got software that wants to >>>>>>>> access my medical information. It calls an RS and requests access, but it >>>>>>>> hasn’t been granted anything yet. Now I as the RO have set up the RS so >>>>>>>> that it talks to my personal AS, that only I use. In addition to the RS >>>>>>>> having to be able to figure out which medical records are being requested >>>>>>>> from the context of the unauthenticated request (which means it needs >>>>>>>> identifiers in the URL or something similar for the RS to be able to tell, >>>>>>>> assuming that it protects data for more than one person). So this client >>>>>>>> software doesn’t know who I am and doesn’t know my medical record >>>>>>>> information, makes a completely unauthorized request to the RS, and the RS >>>>>>>> says “Go to Justin’s personal AS to get a token”. The client can now make a >>>>>>>> direct correlation between the data that’s being protected at the RS and >>>>>>>> the person running the AS that protects it. Importantly, this client makes >>>>>>>> this call with no prior relationship to the RS and no really auditable way >>>>>>>> to track it down after the fact. This is a design feature in the good case, >>>>>>>> and terrifying in the bad case. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> If the RS instead says “welcome to Medicine Doctor RS, please talk >>>>>>>> to the Medicine Doctor AS to get access”, we haven’t exposed anything at >>>>>>>> all. And from the perspective of both the patient and the RS, this is more >>>>>>>> privacy-preserving, and it’s really the least surprising option. Once the >>>>>>>> client gets to the AS, it can start a negotiation of figuring out who the >>>>>>>> RO is for the information being accessed. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> On top of this, the usability expectations of people managing their >>>>>>>> own AS, or set of AS’s for multiple personas to keep things separate, is a >>>>>>>> huge burden. Even in the tech community, I know people who can’t reliably >>>>>>>> manage more than one email address for different purposes. I wouldn’t >>>>>>>> expect my partner to do that — they have trouble enough balancing all the >>>>>>>> logins and sessions required for different kids remote schooling, I >>>>>>>> couldn’t imagine them having to understand all the requirements for >>>>>>>> managing multiple authorization servers and associated policies. I also >>>>>>>> don’t expect any person to “manage keys” — I’ve been on the internet for >>>>>>>> decades and I can barely keep tabs on my GPG keys, and only use them when I >>>>>>>> am forced to. This is exactly the kind of “market pressure” that I think >>>>>>>> Ben mentions above, people will just want to outsource that to someone >>>>>>>> else, and the reality will be a few popular providers. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> In which case, we could end up doing a ton of work to allow an RS >>>>>>>> choice only to end up with a world where the RS ends up making a limited >>>>>>>> choice anyway. We see how that plays out with OpenID Connect — RP’s could >>>>>>>> allow arbitrary IdPs but they choose Google because it works and that’s >>>>>>>> where the users are. (And that’s not to say anything of the proprietary >>>>>>>> OIDC-like protocols, but that’s another discussion). >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> For further reading on these topics, I recommend both “Why Johnny >>>>>>>> Can’t Encrypt” and “Why CSCW Systems Fail”. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> So what does this have to do with GNAP? I think we can be >>>>>>>> clear-eyed on what kinds of expectations we have for the participants. If >>>>>>>> we expect users (RO’s) to have to set up the AS-RS relationship, or expect >>>>>>>> them to carry their AS, or manage their personal keys — I think we’ve lost >>>>>>>> the battle for relevance. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> — Justin >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>> TXAuth mailing list >>>>> TXAuth@ietf.org >>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/txauth >>>>> >>>>
- [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architecture? Adrian Gropper
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Adrian Gropper
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Adrian Gropper
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Adrian Gropper
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Adrian Gropper
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Alan Karp
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Adrian Gropper
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Adrian Gropper
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Alan Karp
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Benjamin Kaduk
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Adrian Gropper
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Justin Richer
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Justin Richer
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Adrian Gropper
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Adrian Gropper
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Justin Richer
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Adrian Gropper
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Alan Karp
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Alan Karp
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Alan Karp
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Adrian Gropper
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Alan Karp
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Adrian Gropper
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Adrian Gropper
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Adrian Gropper
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Adrian Gropper
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Denis
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Adrian Gropper
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Justin Richer
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Fabien Imbault
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Adrian Gropper
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Denis
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Justin Richer
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Justin Richer
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Alan Karp
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Justin Richer
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Denis
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Alan Karp
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Adrian Gropper
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Justin Richer
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Adrian Gropper
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Justin Richer
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Adrian Gropper
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Justin Richer
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Alan Karp
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Adrian Gropper
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Alan Karp
- Re: [GNAP] Will GNAP support Zero Trust Architect… Adrian Gropper
- [GNAP] Relationship between Authentication and Au… Denis
- Re: [GNAP] Relationship between Authentication an… Justin Richer
- Re: [GNAP] Relationship between Authentication an… Denis
- Re: [GNAP] Relationship between Authentication an… Justin Richer
- Re: [GNAP] Relationship between Authentication an… Denis
- Re: [GNAP] Relationship between Authentication an… Adrian Gropper
- Re: [GNAP] Relationship between Authentication an… Denis
- Re: [GNAP] Relationship between Authentication an… Adrian Gropper
- [GNAP] Alice a J&J COVID vaccine Denis
- Re: [GNAP] Alice a J&J COVID vaccine Adrian Gropper