Re: [Eligibility-discuss] On 3797 alternatives

Michael StJohns <msj@nthpermutation.com> Thu, 01 June 2023 22:53 UTC

Return-Path: <msj@nthpermutation.com>
X-Original-To: eligibility-discuss@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: eligibility-discuss@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8CB43C15198C for <eligibility-discuss@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu, 1 Jun 2023 15:53:35 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -6.895
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.895 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, NICE_REPLY_A=-0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI=-5, RCVD_IN_ZEN_BLOCKED_OPENDNS=0.001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_NONE=0.001, URIBL_DBL_BLOCKED_OPENDNS=0.001, URIBL_ZEN_BLOCKED_OPENDNS=0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=nthpermutation-com.20221208.gappssmtp.com
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([50.223.129.194]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 9fbTkNxEQRId for <eligibility-discuss@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu, 1 Jun 2023 15:53:31 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from mail-qv1-xf36.google.com (mail-qv1-xf36.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:4864:20::f36]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (128/128 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature RSA-PSS (2048 bits) server-digest SHA256) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id CA725C1516E9 for <eligibility-discuss@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu, 1 Jun 2023 15:53:31 -0700 (PDT)
Received: by mail-qv1-xf36.google.com with SMTP id 6a1803df08f44-6263b2526a0so12551456d6.2 for <eligibility-discuss@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu, 01 Jun 2023 15:53:31 -0700 (PDT)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=nthpermutation-com.20221208.gappssmtp.com; s=20221208; t=1685660010; x=1688252010; h=in-reply-to:from:references:cc:to:content-language:subject :user-agent:mime-version:date:message-id:from:to:cc:subject:date :message-id:reply-to; bh=HDoFQdf8c2diW4ceJ4fNnbk9CNu1DrZEV7UZrdxSZHA=; b=eo0mEjKuXV/aY4/ClKWSCxqxYIIUV2N8upU5ZLsxctcYu5rUmwXxjj1Fg18kdDJUSO 2FDHRSmfjlFE2g+SATcRXnAmkDS0meE4tb1FrpXFqAoGpDXqdT3xGbWoD+bKCs9IK3Wh MOkF9X7GWL/6Wo3GnmT7WNPvRg6Y+giEQL7P/G0GIPjfoaehpIvyx5Q3tSqjOEFImmCP pkFy46I7INAKN8o+W2QznbVaQ+YWACAV8sJaKCvPkvmGCzTQ/pGrqVw7FQeourzu9ARG eDowoi7ZLi4nGLNXL8TUULJIfpUL1G4Dl6p5Wvow22gnkH3KzjK9g/Pv4iI0WnB6Mzsq /yzA==
X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20221208; t=1685660010; x=1688252010; h=in-reply-to:from:references:cc:to:content-language:subject :user-agent:mime-version:date:message-id:x-gm-message-state:from:to :cc:subject:date:message-id:reply-to; bh=HDoFQdf8c2diW4ceJ4fNnbk9CNu1DrZEV7UZrdxSZHA=; b=ji0hdf56i1lf0oTKtpsFYF/uFEkQ99FClGapUkCA8V2YQC1/s1QvbHqYeyYpebBj/4 iy6xjhCAEeZPj5eHXhEdMBZwtXVWIvSaIwIVmPa17hB83we46hkIwHeMF3taU/RZx6SS 8IJ4CxFDv/I+JINQfiFLOYAoqSzs3b3w3566dz8+UacFZUIGmEy7ofkbKWAvYpPES0/g UL4O0Ts4Dwc1HZRmIgfG7w/IxzERoRBIVsqWXpvTBoRTUjyZdUIcho7thMuI9LK1aNbN c0l83X2skvOHiExlb9wIex2f8v1AjV/A8l/vZtsnS9xIKIFjR4ZFDxT9rhQDQWcyAj6s vD8w==
X-Gm-Message-State: AC+VfDwrhK4UMiIAv4I9FpHYPcaL/EXtI1e8o8bUZr5L53Kya1NLIjqL UL60MU83LADeerpv1gz4y9ggNQ==
X-Google-Smtp-Source: ACHHUZ4axUmgm6cDq0sXDw3haQWePSrzUsrVPEtIu6pLWBeC0RRWUlCOoD/m15pTPPkOgr09jUza9A==
X-Received: by 2002:a05:6214:f0c:b0:625:aa48:fb72 with SMTP id gw12-20020a0562140f0c00b00625aa48fb72mr12691757qvb.60.1685660010330; Thu, 01 Jun 2023 15:53:30 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from [192.168.1.23] (pool-108-31-156-76.washdc.fios.verizon.net. [108.31.156.76]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id t18-20020ac865d2000000b003f6a7ab1450sm8188140qto.30.2023.06.01.15.53.29 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 bits=128/128); Thu, 01 Jun 2023 15:53:29 -0700 (PDT)
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="------------0CIfiUaxPCkTX7gbqzBYtY9u"
Message-ID: <26e642df-59f2-8daf-e45d-ee75553a2938@nthpermutation.com>
Date: Thu, 01 Jun 2023 18:53:29 -0400
MIME-Version: 1.0
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:102.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/102.11.0
Content-Language: en-US
To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Cc: Rob Sayre <sayrer@gmail.com>, Donald Eastlake <d3e3e3@gmail.com>, eligibility-discuss@ietfa.amsl.com
References: <CAChr6Szvewhk0_z5DVqTJ37qR6eHxBw0Am2MnycxsS=a9x_bzw@mail.gmail.com> <4b2070b2-21e7-4887-b9a2-1049b930d0be@betaapp.fastmail.com> <CAChr6SyLNfEHxSCaj+w_j4Zzxf0vLudqzfpsGO7kDd1jO1AFLg@mail.gmail.com> <CAF4+nEGAsAvD4Vzy7BVOKVE+5wnGspP+QC+_bYKEWfYihVYdsA@mail.gmail.com> <CAChr6Swg5An=n9gAo1dYA=U_DY-Qd5h48Aq6Wqhf=QUae9pB7Q@mail.gmail.com> <416a8625-1c05-54eb-c90a-fb88c3aa01dc@nthpermutation.com> <CABcZeBPRErHHnvz_k_gabpK3dBXqu7-NWOn8=cgg_XToTGXDXQ@mail.gmail.com>
From: Michael StJohns <msj@nthpermutation.com>
In-Reply-To: <CABcZeBPRErHHnvz_k_gabpK3dBXqu7-NWOn8=cgg_XToTGXDXQ@mail.gmail.com>
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/eligibility-discuss/z_NrZjuI7P41KKUZdSRBPASB00Y>
Subject: Re: [Eligibility-discuss] On 3797 alternatives
X-BeenThere: eligibility-discuss@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.39
Precedence: list
List-Id: IETF eligibility procedures <eligibility-discuss.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/eligibility-discuss>, <mailto:eligibility-discuss-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/eligibility-discuss/>
List-Post: <mailto:eligibility-discuss@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:eligibility-discuss-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/eligibility-discuss>, <mailto:eligibility-discuss-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 01 Jun 2023 22:53:35 -0000

On 6/1/2023 3:47 PM, Eric Rescorla wrote:
>
>
> On Thu, Jun 1, 2023 at 8:43 AM Michael StJohns 
> <msj@nthpermutation.com> wrote:
>
>     Hi -
>
>     Verifiably random is somewhat of an oxymoron.   We can do
>     statistical measurements of data streams, and come to conclusions
>     about how close they meet a given criteria, but that’s a far cry
>     from verifiable.  We can, using similar models usually prove a
>     source to be non random even if we can’t label it as predictable,
>     but the opposite is harder.
>
>     What I think we want is/are sources that meet some set of
>     statistical tests for randomness and that are shown to be
>     resistant to externally applied bias/interference.   The former is
>     pretty simple - take the output and run it through the tests.
>
>     The latter is more about "trustworthiness" than "verifiable
>     randomness".   WRT to the sources used to seed the last dozen or
>     so selections, we assume the trustworthiness because of the nature
>     of the sources and the fact that we combine a number of those
>     sources, but I'd be hard pressed to say that any single given
>     source is "verifiably random" in either meeting statistical tests
>     or resistance to externally applied bias.
>
>
> It's important to distinguish here between random and uniformly 
> distributed.

All large collections of true random bits are uniformly distributed, but 
not all uniform distribution of bits are random.

>
> As an example, imagine we have a randomness source X that produces 1-bit
> values X_1, X_2, .... By hypothesis, this passes the relevant 
> statistical tests.
>
> Now consider a source Y that is constructed as follows:
>
> Y_i =  {  0 if i is odd
>               X_i if i is even }
>
> Y will not pass many statistical tests because it is non-uniformly 
> distributed, but
> it of course contains entropy at 1/2 the rate of X.

But every i where i is odd is predictable and doesn't meet the general 
contract of "if the next bit generated can be predicted with better than 
50% confidence, then the bit is not random".  So it may be a good source 
of entropy (with enough bits produced), but is not directly usable as a 
random stream of bits.  (Hence your comment on hashing below - or the 
use of HKDF extract).

Y_i = X_(i*2)  also has 1/2 the entropy, but any given Y_i is only as 
predictable as a given X_(i*2)

> Fortunately procedures like
> those we use (hashing the inputs) are designed to use the available 
> entropy
> while accepting the non-random bits. This is good because some of these
> sources are not uniform (e.g., the US national debt). [0]
>
> As a result of this, statistical tests are generally not a good guide 
> to whether
> a given entropy source is appropriate.

Fair - but those self same statistical tests usually give some 
indication of the actual entropy production of the input stream. If I 
feed in 10000 bits (in the form of form of the asciification of a dozen 
or so values ) from a single source and get an answer of maybe 4 bits of 
entropy, it suggests that source may not be as useful as we would think.

>
> -Ekr
>
> [0] As an aside, even lottery numbers are not entirely uniform as a 
> bitstream
> unless you encode them properly.
>
>
I'd see something like: 
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/legacy/sp/nistspecialpublication800-22r1a.pdf 
or other papers.

It might be interesting to throw the inputs and outputs of our entropy 
source mixer at the various tests and see how it and they do.

Later, Mike