Re: [idn] nameprep2 and the slash homograph issue

Erik van der Poel <erik@vanderpoel.org> Wed, 23 February 2005 18:24 UTC

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Date: Wed, 23 Feb 2005 10:20:51 -0800
From: Erik van der Poel <erik@vanderpoel.org>
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To: "JFC (Jefsey) Morfin" <jefsey@jefsey.com>
CC: IETF idn working group <idn@ops.ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [idn] nameprep2 and the slash homograph issue
References: <421B8484.3070802@vanderpoel.org> <20050223072837.GA21463~@nicemice.net> <D872CCF059514053ECF8A198@scan.jck.com> <6.1.2.0.2.20050223175234.0355d270@mail.jefsey.com>
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JFC (Jefsey) Morfin wrote:
> Actually I repeat that all the propositions to change what the user can 
> see is user hurting. The need for the click to send a request which the 
> one the user want, not the one the phisher want. IMHO one does not 
> increase security in hiding the existand of the danger, one increases 
> the risks.

Jefsey, it must be difficult to participate in this kind of group when 
English is not your main language, but I, for one, do appreciate your 
wise contributions, so I take them seriously.

However, I must disagree with this particular suggestion (if I 
understand you correctly). If a phisher spams users, it is not the email 
app's responsibility to direct the user to whatever site the app might 
guess is the "correct" one. No, I think it's better for the app to warn 
the user in some way that this is a phishy email, and might be evil.

This is similar to the advice that you should not give your Social 
Security Number (SSN) or credit card number to someone over the phone, 
unless *you* are the one dialing the phone number (using a well-known, 
published phone number).

Erik