Re: Last Call: <draft-nottingham-safe-hint-05.txt> (The "safe" HTTP Preference) to Proposed Standard

joel jaeggli <joelja@bogus.com> Tue, 18 November 2014 17:56 UTC

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Date: Tue, 18 Nov 2014 09:55:49 -0800
From: joel jaeggli <joelja@bogus.com>
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To: Eliot Lear <lear@cisco.com>, Joseph Lorenzo Hall <joe@cdt.org>, Mark Nottingham <mnot@mnot.net>
Subject: Re: Last Call: <draft-nottingham-safe-hint-05.txt> (The "safe" HTTP Preference) to Proposed Standard
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On 11/18/14 9:44 AM, Eliot Lear wrote:
> Hi Joe,
> 
> On 11/18/14, 6:21 PM, Joseph Lorenzo Hall wrote:
>>
>> (Incidentally, if something outside the browser inserts this header it
>> may be very difficult for the user to actually turn off, as well. I'm
>> not sure if that's something you've thought about. In DNT, there are
>> applications you can install that will insert that header for you on
>> each request (AVG does this).)
> 
> If that is detected (and it is easily detected by comparing against a
> TLS request), the content provider is not likely to make use of the safe
> bit.  In fact the content provider is in a good position to warn the
> user that this sort of thing is going on.

The draft not only assumes that proxies should insert this on ones'
behalf, but that such an activity is a normal course of events.

   Furthermore, a proxy (for example, at a school) can associate the
   preference with all (unencrypted) requests flowing through it,
   helping to assure that clients behind it are not exposed to
   "objectionable" content.



> Eliot
>