Re: Last Call: <draft-nottingham-safe-hint-05.txt> (The "safe" HTTP Preference) to Proposed Standard

Matthew Kerwin <matthew@kerwin.net.au> Mon, 27 October 2014 23:41 UTC

Return-Path: <phluid61@gmail.com>
X-Original-To: ietf@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: ietf@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 822F01A8701 for <ietf@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon, 27 Oct 2014 16:41:35 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -1.027
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.027 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, FM_FORGED_GMAIL=0.622, FREEMAIL_ENVFROM_END_DIGIT=0.25, FREEMAIL_FROM=0.001, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=no
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 6q0VKKEPK_68 for <ietf@ietfa.amsl.com>; Mon, 27 Oct 2014 16:41:33 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from mail-qc0-x233.google.com (mail-qc0-x233.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:400d:c01::233]) (using TLSv1 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-RC4-SHA (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 766F21A876F for <ietf@ietf.org>; Mon, 27 Oct 2014 16:39:38 -0700 (PDT)
Received: by mail-qc0-f179.google.com with SMTP id o8so2797620qcw.38 for <ietf@ietf.org>; Mon, 27 Oct 2014 16:39:37 -0700 (PDT)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20120113; h=mime-version:sender:in-reply-to:references:date:message-id:subject :from:to:cc:content-type; bh=0f7IW0yRUbKF+aW/Rx0l+9xV/IrL3ARB8A2QFrtLvfI=; b=olSMxXGyxv34N660rk14mPBLYAnjcePu0XRQWU4GIak05nXnoSCURVdUL9H02KXZ92 9FCwgFKOREUZkcgC5n327COg+NyUiFu/5rYRwtMuz/oNVf8FJqRdE62LmfFuHJm27X4T hTPcLMIFnsAo4BmxnYXueOtY8S8PnnNXrdlFFUogtJFEbHHC+QzVt5dDbzHWyQ3LL8qb DQAYwSYtfsuLmI70ZRCVkzsyOrBnuWHqpzx65LAFCCKOfFDAEfwAt8bHGA2qQcDQK+CP mbdeojQujEMxlbQixD9j/VcyjzW1wa3xIfZk6wU/B9XNVWpePQe+lQGyRaEiAbMi8t1l zg+A==
MIME-Version: 1.0
X-Received: by 10.229.248.5 with SMTP id me5mr38293210qcb.2.1414453177756; Mon, 27 Oct 2014 16:39:37 -0700 (PDT)
Sender: phluid61@gmail.com
Received: by 10.140.29.132 with HTTP; Mon, 27 Oct 2014 16:39:37 -0700 (PDT)
In-Reply-To: <544ECD1A.4010807@gmail.com>
References: <20141027175757.50843.qmail@ary.lan> <544ECD1A.4010807@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 28 Oct 2014 09:39:37 +1000
X-Google-Sender-Auth: C9FOx7uzBqXplGhvNheq99llWnQ
Message-ID: <CACweHNCetKLe02pQLvB-DJCq4FATM1Ehx_4FJmutGmnD+wQpkg@mail.gmail.com>
Subject: Re: Last Call: <draft-nottingham-safe-hint-05.txt> (The "safe" HTTP Preference) to Proposed Standard
From: Matthew Kerwin <matthew@kerwin.net.au>
To: Brian E Carpenter <brian.e.carpenter@gmail.com>
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="001a1133419236349b0506700b4d"
Archived-At: http://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/ietf/k4iHCpC7i3FZE0kHvUYQXHuyn70
Cc: John Levine <johnl@taugh.com>, ietf@ietf.org
X-BeenThere: ietf@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15
Precedence: list
List-Id: IETF-Discussion <ietf.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/ietf>, <mailto:ietf-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/ietf/>
List-Post: <mailto:ietf@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:ietf-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf>, <mailto:ietf-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 27 Oct 2014 23:41:35 -0000

On 28 October 2014 08:54, Brian E Carpenter <brian.e.carpenter@gmail.com>
wrote:

>
> I would have no objection to this being published as an Informational RFC,
> to document existing practice. But to be completely clear, I was *not*
> being
> sarcastic when I compared it to
> ​​
> RFC 3514, because its intended semantics can
> be ignored by any web site operator that chooses to do so.
>
>
"If you were going to ask me if I wanted to use your 'safe mode', you can
assume I'd have said 'yes'" -- it's a pretty hard semantic to ignore, and
the cost of doing so is pretty small anyway. My suspicion is that if sites
already present the option, there'd be motivation to support the hint
(better UX, for one), and no reason at all to ignore it. And for sites that
never presented the choice, well, it's irrelevant to them.

It's not really existing practice, either. Yes, content servers providing
an option for consumers to receive whatever version/subset of the content
the servers consider "safe" (in whatever terms they've couched it) is a
thing, but allowing consumers to preempt the question is new, and that's
what's on offer. And this proposal does it in the simplest way, which can
easily be aligned with the sort of options currently in use (and into the
future).

​I think there's value in it being a proposed standard.

-- 
  Matthew Kerwin
  http://matthew.kerwin.net.au/