Re: Last Call: <draft-nottingham-safe-hint-05.txt> (The "safe" HTTP Preference) to Proposed Standard

Eliot Lear <lear@cisco.com> Tue, 18 November 2014 17:44 UTC

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Date: Tue, 18 Nov 2014 18:44:29 +0100
From: Eliot Lear <lear@cisco.com>
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To: Joseph Lorenzo Hall <joe@cdt.org>, Mark Nottingham <mnot@mnot.net>
Subject: Re: Last Call: <draft-nottingham-safe-hint-05.txt> (The "safe" HTTP Preference) to Proposed Standard
References: <20141021213356.16262.50640.idtracker@ietfa.amsl.com> <54494E98.4070002@cs.tcd.ie> <5464E809.2080507@cdt.org> <E1F171E9-A1A5-4161-9974-AA4077802B9C@mnot.net> <546B8005.3090806@cdt.org>
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Hi Joe,

On 11/18/14, 6:21 PM, Joseph Lorenzo Hall wrote:
>
> (Incidentally, if something outside the browser inserts this header it
> may be very difficult for the user to actually turn off, as well. I'm
> not sure if that's something you've thought about. In DNT, there are
> applications you can install that will insert that header for you on
> each request (AVG does this).)

If that is detected (and it is easily detected by comparing against a
TLS request), the content provider is not likely to make use of the safe
bit.  In fact the content provider is in a good position to warn the
user that this sort of thing is going on.

Eliot