Re: What ASN.1 got right

Phillip Hallam-Baker <phill@hallambaker.com> Wed, 03 March 2021 05:34 UTC

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From: Phillip Hallam-Baker <phill@hallambaker.com>
Date: Wed, 3 Mar 2021 00:34:19 -0500
Message-ID: <CAMm+LwgJG_dcVd01iTQLSh3x0Jd8j2DodnXvsbhipuiFkZRMvw@mail.gmail.com>
Subject: Re: What ASN.1 got right
To: Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com>
Cc: Michael Thomas <mike@mtcc.com>, IETF Discussion Mailing List <ietf@ietf.org>
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The practical limit on certificate lifespan is 48 hours renewed every 24
unless you have a means of reliably getting trusted time into the client.

I have been trying to find info on SSH user certs on and off for quite a
while. Seems like an under-documented feature... They solve a big problem
for me :-)

On Tue, Mar 2, 2021 at 10:36 PM Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com> wrote:

> On Tue, Mar 02, 2021 at 07:00:35PM -0800, Michael Thomas wrote:
> > NRE vs constant help desk. [...]
>
> I can't parse "NRE".
>
> > Where are all of these use cases that need offline verification? I asked
> > somebody else and didn't get an answer.
>
> Admins *really* like to be able to get into their servers when bad
> things happen on their networks and necessary infrastructure is down.
> SSH generally gives you that.
>
> > All of this tells me that there is a witching hour with certs that hasn't
> > been broken in almost 40 years.
>
> Short-lived certs == no one ever forgets to automate the fetching of new
> ones.
>
> When you have two-year certs you need CRLs and OCSP and you always
> forget to renew.
>
> When you have five-day certs you cannot forget to renew more than twice
> because you won't like the constant outages, so you'll automate.
>
> Heck, you could dial that down to eight-hour certs.  After all, with JWT
> we use JWKs that last only a few hours, so you *really* have to fetch
> them on a schedule.
>
> Nico
> --
>