Data at rest (was Re: IETF Chair)

Robert Sparks <rjsparks@nostrum.com> Wed, 14 October 2020 14:29 UTC

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Subject: Data at rest (was Re: IETF Chair)
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From: Robert Sparks <rjsparks@nostrum.com>
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Date: Wed, 14 Oct 2020 09:28:56 -0500
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(Trivial reply to groom the subject. If other forks of the thread 
continue, I hope the next poster there does the same).

RjS

On 10/14/20 9:19 AM, Theodore Y. Ts'o wrote:
> On Tue, Oct 13, 2020 at 07:22:10PM -0400, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:
>> The biggest security problem we face today is breach of data at rest, a
>> confidentiality problem. But 90% of the efforts of the academy and 99% of
>> those of commerce are focused on the Blockchain, an integrity technology.
>> Meanwhile it has taken me most of the last five years working in various
>> forums to persuade people to look at threshold decryption, a technology
>> developed in the 1990s that is actually a confidentiality control capable
>> of securing data at rest.
> I'd agree, but at the same time, I'll note that securing data at rest
> is generally not an issue which is solved via internet protocols and
> interoperability guarantees, but rather is something that needs to be
> designed in hardware (e.g., trusted key stores, firmware verification)
> and in software (trusted boot, multiple layers of encryption in the
> software stack, bring your own key for those customers who demand it)
> and in operational practices (reduction of people with privileged
> access, two person controls, auditing, etc.).
>
> An example of the sorts of things which are needed to secure data at
> rest can be found here[1], from my employer, but all cloud providers
> should have something similar (or they'd better, if they want to
> retain customer trust).
>
> [1] https://cloud.google.com/security/overview/whitepaper
>
> If you look at this, you'll find that most of it is out of scope for
> the IETF.
>
> 					- Ted
>