Re: [OSPF] Revised OSPF HMAC SHA Authentication Draft

Acee Lindem <acee@cisco.com> Tue, 22 August 2006 19:44 UTC

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Date: Tue, 22 Aug 2006 15:44:35 -0400
From: Acee Lindem <acee@cisco.com>
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To: Tom Sanders <toms.sanders@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [OSPF] Revised OSPF HMAC SHA Authentication Draft
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Tom Sanders wrote:
> Manav,
>
>> We dont need to use a new auth type value for each new authentication 
>> scheme > that comes up in the future.
>>
>> One can define a new generic auth type 3, which would carry the 
>> authentication > algorithm details in addition to the Key ID, auth 
>> data length and the crypto
>> sequence number. The authentication data for type auth type 3 would 
>> be the
>> same as type 2, except that the reserved bytes would get replaced 
>> with the
>> authentication algorithm ID.
>
> Excellent, this is much better than our initial guess.
>
> Actually one octet is enough for carrying the Algo ID. You are still
> left with one reserved octet. Go Play!
>
>>
>> However, i dont think this is required.
>
> Well, thats something that the WG, and not you and me, have to decide! :)
Hi Tom,

I'd also vote against this since the standardized definition of 
cryptographic
authentication (AuType = 2) was designed to accommodate different hash
algorithms. Based on the discussion heretofore, it seems that its definition
satisfies this requirement. Additionally, I don't see any compatibility 
problems
with implementations unequivocally map AuType 2 to MD5 authentication.
As one would expect, authentication will fail (at least with a very high
probability :^) if there is a mismatch between configured hash algorithms.

Thanks,
Acee

>
>>
>> Cheers,
>> Manav
>>
>> >> On 20/08/06, Phil Cowburn <phil.cowburn@gmail.com> wrote:
>> >>
>> >> I strongly agree with Manav here and an implementation must be 
>> able to
>> >> demultiplex using the Key ID in the incoming packet. It is afterall
>> >> for this very reason that we put the Key ID in the packet.
>> >>
>> >> Erblichs point, as i read it is, that most implementations (if not
>> >> all) currently take type 2 to mean MD5. This may break once this 
>> draft
>> >> becomes a standard, which it would, in some time.
>> >>
>> >> My take on this is that even if the WG agrees to Erblichs solution 
>> and
>> >> introduces a new type, say 3 for HMAC-SHA-1 authentication, then
>> >> somebody else could repeat the same argument and clamour for a new
>> >> type when we're introducing newer authentication algorithms in the
>> >> future.
>> >>
>>
>

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