Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Document request forgery (#3996)

[Christian Huitema <[e-mail]>]

@huitema commented on this pull request.



> +
+The most effective defense against request forgery attacks is to modify
+vulnerable services to use strong authentication. However, this is not always
+possible when deploying QUIC. This section outlines some others steps that QUIC
+endpoints could take. These additional steps are all discretionary as,
+depending on circumstances, they could interfere with or prevent legitimate
+uses.
+
+Services offered over loopback interfaces (that is, ::1 or 127.0.0.1) often
+lack proper authentication. Endpoints MAY prevent connection attempts or
+migration to a loopback address. Endpoints SHOULD NOT allow connections or
+migration to a non-loopback address if the same service was previously
+available over a different interface or the address was provided by a service
+at a non-loopback address. Endpoints that depend on these capabilities could
+offer an option to disable these protections.
+

That's nice, but in many scenarios any of the node addresses can be used to reach services local to the node, in the same way as loopback addresses. In server farm scenarios, this requires guessing the local IP of the specific server, but that can probably be done. Same for clients behind NAT.

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