Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Document request forgery (#3996)

Igor Lubashev <> Fri, 14 August 2020 22:16 UTC

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Date: Fri, 14 Aug 2020 15:16:19 -0700
From: Igor Lubashev <>
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Subject: Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Document request forgery (#3996)
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@igorlord commented on this pull request.

> +
+Initial packet protection (Section 5.2 of {{QUIC-TLS}}) makes it difficult for
+servers to control the content of Initial packets. A client choosing an
+unpredictable Destination Connection ID ensures that servers are unable to
+control any of the encrypted portion of Initial packets. However, the Token
+field is open to server control and does allow a server to use clients to mount
+request forgery attacks.
+Use of tokens provided with the NEW_TOKEN frame ({{validate-future}}) offers
+the only option for request forgery during connection establishment.
+Clients are not obligated to use the NEW_TOKEN frame. Request forgery attacks
+that rely on the Token field can be avoided if clients do not include a value
+when the server address has changed from when the NEW_TOKEN frame was received.
+Clients MUST NOT send a token received in a NEW_TOKEN frame from one server

This MUST NOT is qualified by the subsequent text to a point of being unenforceable, especially due to "shared prefix of a sufficient length".  Since it is up to implementations to choose what "sufficient" is, an implementation could deem "/0", to be "sufficient" and it would be valid.  Since this is unenforceable, it probably warrants a "SHOULD NOT".

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