Re: [quicwg/base-drafts] Output of the discard keys design team (#2673)

[Christopher Wood <[e-mail]>]

chris-wood commented on this pull request.



> @@ -724,6 +703,35 @@ This results in abandoning loss recovery state for the Initial encryption level
 and ignoring any outstanding Initial packets.
 
 
+### Discarding Handshake Keys
+
+An endpoint MUST NOT discard its handshake keys until the TLS handshake is
+confirmed ({{handshake-confirmed}}).  An endpoint SHOULD discard its handshake
+keys as soon as it has confirmed the handshake.  Most applications protocols

```suggestion
keys as soon as it has confirmed the handshake.  Most application protocols
```

> +An endpoint MUST NOT discard its handshake keys until the TLS handshake is
+confirmed ({{handshake-confirmed}}).  An endpoint SHOULD discard its handshake
+keys as soon as it has confirmed the handshake.  Most applications protocols
+will send data after the handshake, generating acknowledgements and ensuring
+that both endpoints can discard their handshake keys promptly.  Endpoints that
+do not have reason to send immediately after completing the handshake MAY send
+ack-eliciting frames, such as PING, which will cause the handshake to be
+confirmed when they are acknowledged.
+
+
+### Discarding 0-RTT Keys
+
+Clients SHOULD discard 0-RTT keys as soon as they install 1-RTT keys, since
+they have no use after that moment.
+
+Clients do not send 0-RTT packets after sending a 1-RTT

nit: should "do not" be "MUST NOT" to mirror the text below which reads, "Once a client has installed 1-RTT keys, it MUST NOT send any more 0-RTT packets."?

> @@ -1086,25 +1097,44 @@ before the final TLS handshake messages are received.  A client will be unable
 to decrypt 1-RTT packets from the server, whereas a server will be able to
 decrypt 1-RTT packets from the client.
 
-However, a server MUST NOT process data from incoming 1-RTT protected packets
-before verifying either the client Finished message or - in the case that the
-server has chosen to use a pre-shared key - the pre-shared key binder (see
-Section 4.2.11 of {{!TLS13}}).  Verifying these values provides the server with
-an assurance that the ClientHello has not been modified.  Packets protected with
+Even though 1-RTT keys are available to a server after receiving the first
+handshake messages from a client, it is missing assurances on the state of the
+client:

```suggestion

```

> @@ -1086,25 +1097,44 @@ before the final TLS handshake messages are received.  A client will be unable
 to decrypt 1-RTT packets from the server, whereas a server will be able to
 decrypt 1-RTT packets from the client.
 
-However, a server MUST NOT process data from incoming 1-RTT protected packets
-before verifying either the client Finished message or - in the case that the
-server has chosen to use a pre-shared key - the pre-shared key binder (see
-Section 4.2.11 of {{!TLS13}}).  Verifying these values provides the server with
-an assurance that the ClientHello has not been modified.  Packets protected with
+Even though 1-RTT keys are available to a server after receiving the first
+handshake messages from a client, it is missing assurances on the state of the

```suggestion
handshake messages from a client, it is missing assurances on the client state:
```

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