Re: [saag] Discuss at SAAG? was Re: nation state crypto profiles - draft-jenkins-cnsa-cmc-profile-00

Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com> Tue, 02 October 2018 21:15 UTC

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Date: Tue, 02 Oct 2018 16:15:39 -0500
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From: Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com>
To: Carl Wallace <carl@redhoundsoftware.com>
Cc: Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>, saag@ietf.org
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References: <alpine.LRH.2.21.1810021055160.25461@bofh.nohats.ca> <D7D94F2D.C22E0%carl@redhoundsoftware.com>
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Subject: Re: [saag] Discuss at SAAG? was Re: nation state crypto profiles - draft-jenkins-cnsa-cmc-profile-00
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On Tue, Oct 02, 2018 at 04:41:06PM -0400, Carl Wallace wrote:
> What's the difference between a nation state profile and a similar or same
> profile that has been marshaled through a commercial entity?

None, of course.

I don't object to having codepoint assignments for all sorts of
cryptographic algorithms from various nation states and even
corporations.

I also don't object to FYI publications of these, though presumably any
nation state or large corporation could setup their own SDOs, therefore
we perhaps should not lend then either the ISE's nor the IETF nor
RFC-Editor's resources -- we just can't really refuse IANA resources.

What we should want is for required-to-implement algorithms to be ones
we reasonably believe are secure, and we should pick those for reasons
other than national origin of said algorithms.  We should make these
decisions on a case-by-case basis, as we long have.

Nico
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