Re: [saag] Discuss at SAAG? was Re: nation state crypto profiles - draft-jenkins-cnsa-cmc-profile-00

Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com> Tue, 02 October 2018 22:03 UTC

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From: Yoav Nir <ynir.ietf@gmail.com>
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Date: Wed, 03 Oct 2018 01:02:55 +0300
In-Reply-To: <alpine.LRH.2.21.1810021734350.12702@bofh.nohats.ca>
Cc: Rich Salz <rsalz@akamai.com>, Security Area Advisory Group <saag@ietf.org>
To: Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca>
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Subject: Re: [saag] Discuss at SAAG? was Re: nation state crypto profiles - draft-jenkins-cnsa-cmc-profile-00
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> On 3 Oct 2018, at 0:36, Paul Wouters <paul@nohats.ca> wrote:
> 
> On Tue, 2 Oct 2018, Salz, Rich wrote:
> 
>> *  (e.g. TLS ciphersuites identifiers) to use them for national-wide purposes 
>> *  along with "first class" algorithms. 
>> TLS has moved to “doc required”  Not “RFC required.”  And added a column that says whether it is “recommended” or “no comment.”  This seems like it will work out well.
> 
> Similarly, for IKE/IPsec, the IANA registries are Expert Review, not "RFC required”

Right. So if SAAG (or the IESG) can guide the designated experts about national crypto, that would be great.

Suppose (and this is just an example) the Russian government would like to use TLS 1.3 with the Kuznyechik cipher. This is assuming that it has an AEAD mode defined, so it can be used. They have several options:
They can publish a document on gostperevod.com <http://gostperevod.com/> and ask IANA to register the Kuznyechik AEAD in the TLS registries.
They can publish a draft (in addition to #1) and then ask IANA to register the Kuznyechik AEAD in the TLS registry while asking the RFC editor to publish.
The can publish on gostperevod.com <http://gostperevod.com/> and tell everyone to squat on (0x13, 0x79)

I think we can all agree that #3 is a bad outcome, but that is what they will do if IANA won’t allocate identifiers.

IMO #1 is good enough, provided we can get guidance from SAAG or the IESG to recommend such registration.

It should be noted that a line should be drawn somewhere. I think a nation state with serious cryptographers such as Russia should get a code point for its national crypto.  I think someone who has come up with a great new algorithm that he totally cannot break should not get a code point. Somewhere between these two extremes the line should be drawn. The question is where?

Yoav