Re: [secdir] [payload] sec-dir review of draft-ietf-payload-rtp-opus-08

Jean-Marc Valin <jmvalin@mozilla.com> Tue, 07 April 2015 11:55 UTC

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Date: Tue, 07 Apr 2015 07:55:26 -0400
From: Jean-Marc Valin <jmvalin@mozilla.com>
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To: Roni Even <ron.even.tlv@gmail.com>, 'Colin Perkins' <csp@csperkins.org>, 'Robert Sparks' <rjsparks@nostrum.com>
References: <sjmoaosz53h.fsf@securerf.ihtfp.org> <54E3A32F.2010008@jmvalin.ca> <760B7D45D1EFF74988DBF5C2122830C24D064CDE@szxpml507-mbx.exmail.huawei.com> <sjmk2zdzv6g.fsf@securerf.ihtfp.org> <916F29B3-E392-481B-A269-FBA58DFEF14D@nostrum.com> <551C612B.4030702@mozilla.com> <C3DD8EE5-B066-4C06-99F4-B9147A128811@nostrum.com> <C17AE3D5-F62D-42A3-9F1F-885BF1B984EB@nostrum.com> <551EFB9C.4040504@xiph.org> <sjmy4m5grwp.fsf@securerf.ihtfp.org> <269A06E2-6704-4E5E-BBFD-92F157639261@nostrum.com> <5522D40E.8040402@nostrum.com> <73626E80-1EBA-4A85-83DD-32423649DBD1@csperkins.org> <035501d0711a$7856b0a0$690411e0$@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [secdir] [payload] sec-dir review of draft-ietf-payload-rtp-opus-08
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Does anyone object to this earlier proposal?

"Opus does not provide any built-in confidentiality or integrity
protection. Protection requirements vary between RTP applications. See
RFC 7201 and RFC 7202 for a discussion."

If not, that's probably what should go in the RFC (assuming it works
for Kathleen Moriarty's DISCUSS too).

	Jean-Marc

On 07/04/15 06:06 AM, Roni Even wrote:
> 
> 
>> -----Original Message----- From: payload
>> [mailto:payload-bounces@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Colin Perkins 
>> Sent: 06 April, 2015 9:50 PM To: Robert Sparks Cc:
>> secdir@ietf.org; payload@ietf.org; jspittka@gmail.com;
>> iesg@ietf.org; payload-chairs@tools.ietf.org;
>> koenvos74@gmail.com; Derek Atkins Subject: Re: [payload] [secdir]
>> sec-dir review of
> draft-ietf-payload-rtp-opus-08
>> 
>> On 6 Apr 2015, at 19:44, Robert Sparks <rjsparks@nostrum.com>
>> wrote:
>>> inline (particularly for Derek) On 4/6/15 11:13 AM, Ben
>>> Campbell wrote:
>>>> On 6 Apr 2015, at 11:09, Derek Atkins wrote:
>>>> 
>>>>> "Timothy B. Terriberry" <tterribe@xiph.org> writes:
>>>>> 
>>>>>> Ben Campbell wrote:
>>>>>>>> So my suggestion would be something more to the
>>>>>>>> effect of:
>>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>> "Opus does not provide any built-in confidentiality
>>>>>>>> or integrity protection. Protection requirements vary
>>>>>>>> between RTP applications. See RFC 7201 and RFC 7202
>>>>>>>> for a discussion.
>>>>>> 
>>>>>> This seems like reasonable text to me. I agree with the
>>>>>> rationale that preceded it. As much as I want to see
>>>>>> encryption everywhere, a payload format is not the right
>>>>>> place to mandate it.
>>>>> 
>>>>> As was stated already in this thread, the expected follow
>>>>> up drafts for MTI security have not been written.
>>>>> 
>>>>> I leave it up to the Security ADs who have the real power
>>>>> here, but I still prefer my original wording (including the
>>>>> SHOULD).
>>>>> 
>>>>> I understand your reluctance because it's a codec, but it's
>>>>> the first codec to get through the process since the
>>>>> Perpass work, which basically says "everything should be
>>>>> encrypted."  Since you cannot go back in time to modify the
>>>>> existing RFCs, you can augment them going forward by other
>>>>> additions.
>>>>> 
>>>>> As for the concern about "different security requirements
>>>>> for different codecs", frankly I don't buy that argument.
>>>>> Either your RTP application supports security or it
>>>>> doesn't.  Once it does, it should be able to negotiate that
>>>>> along side the codec negotitation. So I don't see the
>>>>> concern -- we're not mandating a specific security
>>>>> technology, just that you SHOULD use one.  Well, that's 
>>>>> true regardless of the codec, isn't it?
>>>>> 
>>>>> Or are you really saying "We don't care about security.  We
>>>>> just want to be able to use this codec in existing,
>>>>> insecure RTP applications without adding new securty
>>>>> measures"?
>>>> 
>>>> I'm saying this is the wrong layer to solve the problem.
>>>> 
>>>> We had some work planned to better specify this in general
>>>> for RTP. I
> think
>> the right answer is finish that work. If we do that right, it
>> should apply regardless of codec.
>>>> 
>>> That's exactly right.
>>> 
>>> We've had this conversation several times before. The
>>> individual payload
>> documents are not the place to add the kind of guidance Derek is
>> asking
> for.
>> They should be about how you put things in RTP, not how
>> applications use
> (and
>> secure RTP), unless there's something unique about the payload
>> that
> interacts
>> with the general mechanics for using and securing RTP.
>>> 
>>> Stephen will remember that we've queued up work on a document
>>> that would
>> describe securing unicast RTP set up with SDP (capturing the
>> outcome of
> the
>> rtpsec bof at IETF68). The last I heard on the subject Dan Wing
>> was taking
> the
>> token to work on that document, but it's been awhile. That's
>> where the
> effort
>> should focus - an individual payload document is not the right
>> place.
>> 
>> +1
>> 
>> As Robert, and others, say, RTP payload format documents are not
>> the right place to mandate security mechanisms. This is the point
>> of RFC7202, which
> is
>> about how strong security can best be defined for classes of RTP
> applications.
>> This is not in conflict with the perpass work, since the goal of
>> RFC7202
> is to
>> show how to provide strong security.
> [Roni Even] What Colin says +1
> 
>> 
>> -- Colin Perkins https://csperkins.org/
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> _______________________________________________ payload mailing
>> list payload@ietf.org 
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/payload
> 
> _______________________________________________ payload mailing
> list payload@ietf.org 
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/payload
> 
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