Re: [secdir] sec-dir review of draft-ietf-payload-rtp-opus-08

["Ben Campbell" <[e-mail]>]

([e-mail])

I just noticed this thread is has included the payload mail list. Since 
the discussion involves potential material changes (i.e. normative 
language changes) , the working group should at least see it.

/Ben.

On 1 Apr 2015, at 17:50, Ben Campbell wrote:

> On 1 Apr 2015, at 16:20, Jean-Marc Valin wrote:
>
>> Based on Derek's latest suggestion, the text would become:
>>
>> "Since Opus does not provide any confidentiality or integrity
>> protection, implementations SHOULD use one of the possible RTP
>> Security methods (See RFC7201, RFC7202)."
>>
>> I think that should resolve the issue that was raised.
>
> I'm not sure that's the right solution. First, 7201 and 7202 are 
> informational, so I'm not sure we want to insert a normative reference 
> to them here.
>
> But more to the point, while I concur with the desire to push for 
> better protections, I don't think a codec payload spec is the right 
> place to do it. It risks having different security requirements for 
> different codecs when used by the same RTP application. I can see that 
> if there are really security difference (e.g. if some codec had built 
> in protection.)
>
> I think this is rather the point of 7202, although I notice section 6 
> of that draft says: "It is also expected that a similar [MTI crypto 
> spec] will be produced for voice-over-IP applications using SIP and 
> RTP." Unfortunately, I don't think that ever happened.
>
> So my suggestion would be something more to the effect of:
>
> "Opus does not provide any built-in confidentiality or integrity
> protection. Protection requirements vary between RTP applications.
> See RFC 7201 and RFC 7202 for a discussion.
>
>>
>> 	Jean-Marc
>>
>> On 01/04/15 05:11 PM, Ben Campbell wrote:
>>> Hi Roni and Derek,
>>>
>>> This thread sort of tailed off in February. Has the discussion been
>>> resolved?
>>>
>>> Thanks!
>>>
>>> Ben.
>>>
>>> On 19 Feb 2015, at 11:07, Derek Atkins wrote:
>>>
>>>> Roni,
>>>>
>>>> I'm not an RTP guy.  To me "SRTP" is a general class of "Secure
>>>> RTP" protocols.  So let's work on that as my starting point:
>>>> implementations SHOULD protect their RTP stream.
>>>>
>>>> Based on that, how about a re-wording here?  Instead of just
>>>> saying "MAY use SRTP", how about something like "SHOULD use one
>>>> of the possible RTP Security methods (See RFC7201, RFC7202)"?
>>>> (Obviously this can be worded better).
>>>>
>>>> -derek
>>>>
>>>> Roni Even <[e-mail]> writes:
>>>>
>>>>> Hi, The reason for the may is discussed in RFC7201 and RFC
>>>>> 7202, it can be a SHOULD and these RFCs exaplain when it is not
>>>>> required to use SRTP. Maybe add a reference to these RFCs in
>>>>> the security section when saying talking about good reasons for
>>>>> not using SRTP
>>>>>
>>>>> Roni Even
>>>>>
>>>>> ________________________________________ From: Jean-Marc Valin
>>>>> [[e-mail]] on behalf of Jean-Marc Valin
>>>>> [[e-mail]] Sent: Tuesday, February 17, 2015 10:23
>>>>> PM To: Derek Atkins; [e-mail]; [e-mail] Cc:
>>>>> [e-mail]; [e-mail];
>>>>> [e-mail] Subject: Re: sec-dir review of
>>>>> draft-ietf-payload-rtp-opus-08
>>>>>
>>>>> Hi Derek,
>>>>>
>>>>> There was no particular reason for the MAY, the text was merely
>>>>> copied from other RTP payload RFC. I totally agree with making
>>>>> it a SHOULD.
>>>>>
>>>>> Thanks,
>>>>>
>>>>> Jean-Marc
>>>>>
>>>>> On 17/02/15 02:54 PM, Derek Atkins wrote:
>>>>>> Hi,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I have reviewed this document as part of the security
>>>>>> directorate's ongoing effort to review all IETF documents
>>>>>> being processed by the IESG.  These comments were written
>>>>>> with the intent of improving security requirements and
>>>>>> considerations in IETF drafts.  Comments not addressed in
>>>>>> last call may be included in AD reviews during the IESG
>>>>>> review.  Document editors and WG chairs should treat these
>>>>>> comments just like any other last call comments.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Summary:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Ready to publish with a question: I question why the use of
>>>>>> SRTP is a MAY and not a SHOULD (as detailed in the Security
>>>>>> Considerations section).  Considering PERPASS I believe this
>>>>>> should be a SHOULD; someone should have a very good reason
>>>>>> why they are NOT using SRTP.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Details:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> This document defines the Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP)
>>>>>> payload format for packetization of Opus encoded speech and
>>>>>> audio data necessary to integrate the codec in the most
>>>>>> compatible way. Further, it describes media type
>>>>>> registrations for the RTP payload format.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I have no other comments on this document.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> -derek
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> _______________________________________________ secdir mailing
>>>>> list [e-mail]
>>>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/secdir wiki:
>>>>> http://tools.ietf.org/area/sec/trac/wiki/SecDirReview
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> -- Derek Atkins                 617-623-3745 [e-mail]
>>>> www.ihtfp.com Computer and Internet Security Consultant