Re: [sidr] [Idr] No BGPSEC intradomain ?
Robert Raszuk <robert@raszuk.net> Tue, 10 April 2012 17:49 UTC
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Date: Tue, 10 Apr 2012 19:49:25 +0200
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To: Warren Kumari <warren@kumari.net>
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Cc: "idr@ietf.org List" <idr@ietf.org>, sidr@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [sidr] [Idr] No BGPSEC intradomain ?
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Hi Warren, Not seeing the problem/error does not mean it is not there. I would in fact encourage in the initial years of deployment to use both to easily detect bugs and inconsistency issues. In my view we should do all BGP processing based on "legacy" attributes and BGPSEC should be a hint to the local operator on how to treat the update. Actually I am of the opinion (I think similar to some research voices in US) that secured BGP (or for that matter even origin validation) should be handled by few BGP Route Controllers providing AS based overlay certificate processing rather then by each individual BGP speaker in the network. BGP should be able to transport it as purely opaque information which could after automatic detection be used as best path decision/preference factor in a given AS. Regards, R. > On Apr 10, 2012, at 12:52 PM, Christopher Morrow wrote: > >> On Tue, Apr 10, 2012 at 12:34 PM, Robert Raszuk<robert@raszuk.net> wrote: >>> Anyhow my doubt has been answered and I stay by my opinion that not sending >>> AS_PATH and AS4_PATH is a terrible idea. >> >> So... we can send the data along, but in the case of BGPSEC speakers >> the data isn't used (it's replicated in the BGPSEC_SIGNED_PATH). >> Carrying extra bits isn't actually helpful is it? (the implementers >> drove the design decision here I believe) > > I think that sone of the biggest issues to keep in mind with carrying the "same" data in two places is what to do when you suddenly discover that they are not actually the same? > > There has been much good work in IDR to better handle bugs / implementations issues, and these considerations probably had much to do with this... > > For example, I'm a BGPSEC speaker. In the BGPSEC bits I see: > > AS1 AS2 AS3 AS4 AS5 All this checks out, the magic crypto says all is happy, etc. > but, in the AS_PATH I see: > AS1 AS 100 AS17 AS6 > > What do I do here? Do I a: drop the update or b: ignore the issue or c: reset the session or d: prefer the singed or unsigned or e: nasal demons? > Someone who's opinion I really respect once said: Never test for an error condition you don't know how to handle. > > This idea extends this by simply not allowing the error condition to occur. > > You have all of the information to recreate the AS_PATH / AS4_PATH when you leave a BGPSEC domain, and because it is only in one place, you sidestep all sorts of weird error corner cases... > > W > > >> >>> Perhaps one could depreciate it in 20 years when world is upgraded to >>> BGPSEC, but recommending this in BGPSEC protocol draft now is IMHO not >>> helpful for any even potential BGPSEC deployment model. >> >> is it helpful for the folks that write bgp code though? "Hey, you will >> need to re-synthesize the as-path at sec->non-sec boundaries. you need >> to also create sec-path at none->sec boundaries." >> >> -chris >> _______________________________________________ >> sidr mailing list >> sidr@ietf.org >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr >> > > _______________________________________________ > Idr mailing list > Idr@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/idr > >
- [sidr] draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-threats-02: Path sh… Shane Amante
- Re: [sidr] draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-threats-02: Pat… Stephen Kent
- Re: [sidr] draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-threats-02: Pat… Shane Amante
- Re: [sidr] draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-threats-02: Pat… Jakob Heitz
- Re: [sidr] draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-threats-02: Pat… Andrew Chi
- Re: [sidr] draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-threats-02: Pat… Shane Amante
- Re: [sidr] draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-threats-02: Pat… Andrew Chi
- Re: [sidr] draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-threats-02: Pat… Shane Amante
- Re: [sidr] draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-threats-02: Pat… Murphy, Sandra
- Re: [sidr] draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-threats-02: Pat… Andrew Chi
- Re: [sidr] draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-threats-02: Pat… Andrew Chi
- Re: [sidr] draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-threats-02: Pat… Sriram, Kotikalapudi
- Re: [sidr] draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-threats-02: Pat… Robert Raszuk
- Re: [sidr] draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-threats-02: Pat… Jakob Heitz
- Re: [sidr] draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-threats-02: Pat… Sriram, Kotikalapudi
- Re: [sidr] [Idr] draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-threats-0… Robert Raszuk
- Re: [sidr] [Idr] draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-threats-0… Murphy, Sandra
- Re: [sidr] [Idr] draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-threats-0… Robert Raszuk
- Re: [sidr] [Idr] draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-threats-0… Montgomery, Douglas
- Re: [sidr] [Idr] draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-threats-0… Robert Raszuk
- Re: [sidr] [Idr] draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-threats-0… Murphy, Sandra
- [sidr] No BGPSEC intradomain ? Robert Raszuk
- Re: [sidr] [Idr] draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-threats-0… Stephen Kent
- Re: [sidr] draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-threats-02: Pat… Stephen Kent
- Re: [sidr] draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-threats-02: Pat… Stephen Kent
- Re: [sidr] [Idr] No BGPSEC intradomain ? Christopher Morrow
- Re: [sidr] No BGPSEC intradomain ? Warren Kumari
- Re: [sidr] No BGPSEC intradomain ? Robert Raszuk
- Re: [sidr] [Idr] No BGPSEC intradomain ? Christopher Morrow
- Re: [sidr] [Idr] No BGPSEC intradomain ? Robert Raszuk
- Re: [sidr] [Idr] No BGPSEC intradomain ? Warren Kumari
- Re: [sidr] [Idr] No BGPSEC intradomain ? Montgomery, Douglas
- Re: [sidr] [Idr] No BGPSEC intradomain ? Christopher Morrow
- Re: [sidr] [Idr] No BGPSEC intradomain ? Robert Raszuk
- Re: [sidr] [Idr] No BGPSEC intradomain ? Robert Raszuk
- Re: [sidr] [Idr] No BGPSEC intradomain ? Jakob Heitz
- Re: [sidr] [Idr] No BGPSEC intradomain ? Christopher Morrow
- Re: [sidr] [Idr] No BGPSEC intradomain ? Christopher Morrow
- Re: [sidr] [Idr] No BGPSEC intradomain ? Christopher Morrow
- Re: [sidr] [Idr] No BGPSEC intradomain ? Jakob Heitz
- Re: [sidr] [Idr] No BGPSEC intradomain ? Randy Bush
- Re: [sidr] [Idr] No BGPSEC intradomain ? Randy Bush
- Re: [sidr] [Idr] No BGPSEC intradomain ? Robert Raszuk
- Re: [sidr] [Idr] No BGPSEC intradomain ? Paul Jakma
- [sidr] iBGP, BGPSEC and incremental deployment (w… Jeffrey Haas
- Re: [sidr] [Idr] No BGPSEC intradomain ? Christopher Morrow
- Re: [sidr] iBGP, BGPSEC and incremental deploymen… Jakob Heitz
- Re: [sidr] iBGP, BGPSEC and incremental deploymen… Christopher Morrow
- Re: [sidr] [Idr] No BGPSEC intradomain ? Brian Dickson
- Re: [sidr] iBGP, BGPSEC and incremental deploymen… Jeffrey Haas
- Re: [sidr] iBGP, BGPSEC and incremental deploymen… Jeffrey Haas
- Re: [sidr] iBGP, BGPSEC and incremental deploymen… Christopher Morrow
- Re: [sidr] [Idr] No BGPSEC intradomain ? George, Wes
- Re: [sidr] iBGP, BGPSEC and incremental deploymen… George, Wes
- Re: [sidr] [Idr] No BGPSEC intradomain ? George, Wes
- Re: [sidr] [Idr] No BGPSEC intradomain ? Robert Raszuk
- Re: [sidr] [Idr] No BGPSEC intradomain ? Jeffrey Haas
- Re: [sidr] iBGP, BGPSEC and incremental deploymen… Jeffrey Haas
- Re: [sidr] iBGP, BGPSEC and incremental deploymen… Christopher Morrow
- Re: [sidr] iBGP, BGPSEC and incremental deploymen… Jeffrey Haas
- Re: [sidr] [Idr] No BGPSEC intradomain ? George, Wes
- Re: [sidr] [Idr] No BGPSEC intradomain ? Jeffrey Haas
- Re: [sidr] [Idr] No BGPSEC intradomain ? Paul Jakma
- Re: [sidr] iBGP, BGPSEC and incremental deploymen… Jakob Heitz
- Re: [sidr] [Idr] iBGP, BGPSEC and incremental dep… Brian Dickson