[TLS] Re: WG Last Call: draft-ietf-tls-mlkem-08 (Ends 2026-07-08)

Sofia Celi <cherenkov@riseup.net> Fri, 03 July 2026 20:38 UTC

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Subject: [TLS] Re: WG Last Call: draft-ietf-tls-mlkem-08 (Ends 2026-07-08)
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Hi, all!

I was thinking on weighing on this very dramatic discussion for a while, 
and thought it might be worthwhile. For context, as people are now 
checking the credentials of people posting in this mailing list: I’m 
Sofia Celi, not long a go I was the chair of the PQUIP WG, HRPC RC and a 
member of the Ombusteam. I resigned to those positions some months ago. 
I’m also a cryptographer and I have won numerous awards on research by 
the IEEE S&P and NDSS. I have also published extensively on cryptography 
and systems since 2022 at top-tier peer-reviewed publication venues.

I neither support publication nor not publication of this document on 
the reason that I don’t understand why we need such a document (yes, 
organisations and liaison statements have asked for this, but, as far as 
I know, that's a request, not an argument. The IETF publishes on rough 
consensus and technical merit, not on demand. Liaison statements are 
inputs to said judgement, not instructions; and per RFC 7282, consensus 
was never a headcount of who wants something in the first place), but 
also I don’t see much harm on publishing it (to the dismay of some, 
ML-DSA is already a NIST standard. This means it can be freely be used 
by the Internet either in a hybrid manner or solo. Having an IETF 
informational document on this does not hurt in my opinion: in fact, the 
vast majority of people deploying cryptography nowadays i. Don’t even 
know what the IETF is ii. Choose to push any type of cryptography 
regardless of, iii Do not want to bother with the IETF process). 
However, in general I’m fully on board with 
https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-barnes-tls-this-could-have-been-an-email-00.txt: 
the TLS WG is not the best place to discuss cryptography algorithms or 
their political implications: "The typical TLS WG participant is not a 
cryptographer, and the cryptographic choices of TLS users are typically 
dictated by other factors than the opinion of the TLS WG". As noted many 
times on this discussion, ML-DSA already has an IANA code point.

On the basis of RFC 7282, the IETF publishes on rough consensus and 
technical merit. It doesn’t seem to me that the draft has in itself much 
technical merit as it just notes the usage of ML-DSA solo in TLS, as 
ML-DSA is already standardised by another body. This is not to shame the 
authors (who I appreciate a lot for bearing this painful process 
regardless of the decision), but I don't think the purpose of that 
document is to standardise ML-DSA at the IETF and the draft clearly does 
not do that nor the TLS WG is the place to standardise cryptography. I 
guess the consensus question here is to decide that we agree on 
“Recommended:  N”: all the other text on that document is already 
standardised. ML-DSA is a standard, a code point exists, the Internet is 
freely able to use only ML-DSA in TLS 1.3. The only “new” thing this 
draft proposes is “Recommended:  N”. I don’t see publishing this as an 
informational document at the IETF as a “stamp of approval” of the IETF: 
what does that even mean? But, via the same argument, why does this even 
need to be an IETF document?

However, what does worry me is how horrid this process has been. I don’t 
think it is fair to single out a single person for the toxicity of this 
process. From all sides of this discussion I have seen said toxicity. 
There are multiple Signal, Slack, Discord, Twitter (or X nowadays), 
blogs, HN discussions on this topic. Said discussions have reached the 
level of attacking people based on who they are, based on the geographic 
location they come from, publicly mocking people, digging people's work 
and websites and mocking them, publicly accusing them of not independent 
thinking (but rather that someone sent them), attributing bad faith to 
anyone that disagrees with your position. This is shameful. Many of 
those channels and this IETF mailing list have participants that are new 
to the field and it is a shame that they see how other people publicly 
mock others to the degree that people now have to explain their 
credentials. Just for the record: Orr Dunkelman is a very great 
cryptographer that has multiple peer-reviewed publications, has won an 
amazing set of awards and has an enviable career. You can disagree with 
people but that does not give you carte blanche to attack them. That one 
participant is using inflammatory language or publishing blogposts does 
not give you carte blanche to do the same or worse.

I implore this community to follow the chairs guideline: Let’s stick to 
the consensus call, "I support" or do "I do not support" as was 
requested in the email that began this thread. Statement as the 
following  are not constructive and are quite toxic:

- Labelling parts of a community credible and others as not
- Asking who sent someone to weigh on the discussion
- Publicly stating that people leaving the IETF is a good thing (there 
are many on the community that have left due to feeling discriminated 
against, and seeing this does not do any good job at making it better 
for underrepresent people). Once you're telling interlocutors you'd be 
glad to see them leave, you've stopped trying to persuade anyone and 
started performing contempt for an audience.
- Assigning people positions based on the organisations they work or 
have worked for
- Demanding that participants recite their credentials before their 
views are treated as legitimate
- Mocking people's professional work, CVs, personal websites or publications
- Characterising a draft, or its authors, as secretly acting on behalf 
of a government agency
- Treating someone's nationality or where they are based as relevant to 
the merits of their argument
- Using another participant's incivility or blogposts as a licence for 
your own
- Framing technical disagreement as proof of incompetence or bad faith

None of the above bears on rough consensus or technical merit, which, 
per RFC 7282, is the only question in front of us. If you need to resort 
to the points above to make your point, then you are not really making a 
point. I also implore the chairs and ADs to moderate more firmly this 
discussion.

I fully expect this to end with people mocking my work or me across the 
various channels, or sending me messages directly. I won't be debating 
it with anyone, and I'd gently point out that proving my point for me 
isn't the flex some may think it is.

Thank you,
-- 
Sofía Celi
@claucece
Cryptographic research and implementation at Brave and University of 
Bristol. 🏳️‍🌈
Reach me out at: cherenkov@riseup.net
Website: https://sofiaceli.com/