[TLS] Re: WG Last Call: draft-ietf-tls-mlkem-08 (Ends 2026-07-08)

[Yaroslav Rosomakho <[e-mail]>]

Yes, please publish this document.

-yaroslav

On Wed, Jun 24, 2026 at 4:01 PM Joseph Salowey via Datatracker <
[e-mail]> wrote:

> This message initiates a new Working Group Last Call for
> draft-ietf-tls-mlkem[1], which defines standalone ML-KEM key establishment
> for TLS 1.3. The main question before the working group is: "Should the
> working group publish a document specifying stand alone ML-KEM?". If there
> is rough consensus then we will push to refine and publish the document;
> otherwise, we will stop discussing the draft and not progress it. Please
> respond to this call indicating whether you support publishing a document
> specifying a stand alone ML-KEM. Please refrain from further discussion on
> this topic as most arguments have been discussed multiple times.
>
> Why are we holding this consensus call now?
>
> Significant developments have occurred both within this document and in
> the broader TLS ecosystem to address the concerns raised in the last WGLC.
> Therefore, the third consensus call is warranted. We ask the working group
> to consider document publication in light of these recent changes:
>
> - Promotion of Hybrids in draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-mlkem: Following a separate
> consensus call, the WG agreed to promote the X25519MLKEM768 hybrid group to
> Recommended: Y in the IANA registry. Consequently, the IANA registry will
> reflect a clear community preference for a hybrid because Recommended: Y
> clearly indicates this while the standalone ML-KEM groups defined in this
> draft remain Recommended: N. The updated security considerations in [1]
> reference the IANA registry to emphasize this preference.
>
> - Key Share Reuse Prohibited in draft-ietf-tls-rfc8446bis: The WG recently
> reached consensus to explicitly prohibit key share reuse across connections
> in TLS 1.3. The new text changes the guidance from SHOULD NOT to a strict
> MUST NOT. This resolves the concerns regarding static key reuse and its
> associated privacy and forward-secrecy risks for ML-KEM.
>
> - Nadim updated the ProVerif model of TLS 1.3 to evaluate KEM and hybrid
> KEM groups in TLS 1.3. This supports other results which show that KEMs are
> secure when used in TLS 1.3 and that hybrid groups are secure even if one
> of the components is compromised.
>
> - Liaisons: We received liaison statements from multiple SDOs including
> O-RAN[2], IEEE 802.11[4] and from 3GPP[3]  expressing support for the
> publication of draft-ietf-tls-mlkem as an RFC as they rely on the IETF to
> provide a stable normative reference.
>
> Please note that a third-party IPR disclosure exists [5] against this
> document regarding patents related to the underlying ML-KEM algorithm. This
> IPR declaration has not changed since the last WGLC. As a reminder, per BCP
> 79, the IETF takes no stance on the validity of patent claims, and the
> working group may decide to proceed with a technology despite IPR
> disclosures if it decides that such use is warranted.
>
> Conduct Reminder: Given the heated nature of previous discussions on this
> topic, participants are strongly reminded to adhere to the IETF Code of
> Conduct (BCP 54) and the TLS WG's Mail List Procedures. Keep feedback
> professional, technical, and focused on the document's text.
>
> This working group last call will end on 2026-07-08.
>
> Joe and Sean
>
> [1] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-mlkem/
> [2] https://datatracker.ietf.org/liaison/2198/
> [3] https://datatracker.ietf.org/liaison/2151/
> [4] https://datatracker.ietf.org/liaison/2148/
> [5]
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/ipr/search/?submit=draft&id=draft-ietf-tls-mlkem
>
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