[TLS] Re: [EXTERNAL] Re: Re: WG Last Call: draft-ietf-tls-mlkem-08 (Ends 2026-07-08)

Daniel Apon <dapon.crypto@gmail.com> Thu, 02 July 2026 23:07 UTC

Return-Path: <dapon.crypto@gmail.com>
X-Original-To: tls@mail2.ietf.org
Delivered-To: tls@mail2.ietf.org
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail2.ietf.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id C40D610D1A6DB for <tls@mail2.ietf.org>; Thu, 2 Jul 2026 16:07:29 -0700 (PDT)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=ietf.org; s=ietf1; t=1783033649; bh=v6dQxFJgH69pTbPArpEN3ZJVeN9OMeMusnsnDVIc/Y4=; h=References:In-Reply-To:From:Date:Subject:To:Cc; b=xdTSfUBIYMdjbGtIZJ6VImjp7+uLmlgP0s0JZzxJDe3PVQ06LiIsdqoLYvlpzj8Jk dK8INbv/6tGq9GZ10aveUVSI3hEIP2Wa66k3WaKcWba+p0rwekS19oTOyP+OgiYzMz xHBGSdGfTRS47AxgsblaN1Yy4sbwotiDOxjWB7fQ=
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at ietf.org
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.088
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.088 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_EF=-0.1, FREEMAIL_FROM=0.001, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001, T_KAM_HTML_FONT_INVALID=0.01] autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no
Authentication-Results: mail2.ietf.org (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=gmail.com
Received: from mail2.ietf.org ([166.84.6.31]) by localhost (mail2.ietf.org [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id IYJNZsjAfF1x for <tls@mail2.ietf.org>; Thu, 2 Jul 2026 16:07:28 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from mail-lf1-x136.google.com (mail-lf1-x136.google.com [IPv6:2a00:1450:4864:20::136]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (128/128 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature ECDSA (P-256) server-digest SHA256) (No client certificate requested) by mail2.ietf.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 070BA10D1A1B0 for <tls@ietf.org>; Thu, 2 Jul 2026 16:03:07 -0700 (PDT)
Received: by mail-lf1-x136.google.com with SMTP id 2adb3069b0e04-5aec5675c46so2368159e87.1 for <tls@ietf.org>; Thu, 02 Jul 2026 16:03:06 -0700 (PDT)
ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; t=1783033386; cv=none; d=google.com; s=arc-20260327; b=GuyVWquJ/o6v376rnENPVkuL0JiYT3oarallR6tX6PaHAStlO4O2LaExEbcb+T46gg Hdn57KG6wyWne3XMBVmgaHw2fWosQk9p7jdutMg8FI6yMNbD02RHpsxoFJ4HoaIlL5Ig yhUV8J+swKeDVte8WegSAvVSL5zcYA1WPDOoXUNKRhRgkML2Cd891z8YYz1ZEWgG5lRP WUgo81AamDoF0kWLnO94ND+Twn37uHBxv/CMLSLvQkKZ82WQGBaeVNsEVJe8YLbrJyai hPX67AJ5T84w7j3E/ENW14va4J1gRLqd6Eu3aNHyVuM29AvjxCLku9VUlIOAhsnbwYD4 OPCA==
ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=arc-20260327; h=cc:to:subject:message-id:date:from:in-reply-to:references :mime-version:dkim-signature; bh=7VpgNKWuumHymO83GBBD2TJ3w7J4HixgEug6pLVib48=; fh=PtWWwQSZZpb86nHZ57sIOEyDV6aJR3W2DgZZy1iepWI=; b=LWAsLui7dJtlThUTweLfDR/L6k4iqO32CRDQS/3nrj20rUYMIXc/68Chskf2BPQ1sI PI/WcDHrnNkjL3LWVmCauqgjbta65V/xh0Ip57zyAFt6g0zQteqtC7H4R1KF5DakMy1L CHkK0hf+Vm3gdKNhkXKi6clEZr4/tFiAHuyfGVH3RJD33hn7wmd31Z6mqU1VOYf/rqN2 dyLxlsp7yu17D03CnZaEoh/fzkmNVz0pInvh6DdQl1hgSHx3f3zcxhgQKEqQb67fQsy2 zfs6NsB97jvUeAkrwyzDHipG/k7sitClggg6dNHfDRyIQ5GMzwrT4tQVdCKzK4kzwtIf re0g==; darn=ietf.org
ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; mx.google.com; arc=none
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20251104; t=1783033386; x=1783638186; darn=ietf.org; h=cc:to:subject:message-id:date:from:in-reply-to:references :mime-version:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:reply-to; bh=7VpgNKWuumHymO83GBBD2TJ3w7J4HixgEug6pLVib48=; b=rrJbnHv99l8VpxrqeZ4eOH05o89pm8ICq0ownoHoa3C+mdzUzF6uLpgAQNKPydaWL+ moC0PeN7JGrCG4Qb/BRWOT3mnhKVYprD7xyPKoptQYZrXMy4NLaIpBvT1mScm9irHA+M O58eu2EXuadzJSfL7dFB76JyCSAckZfU4+XxEYhF+FrOf12hMUDXHzWobttUugP0i197 alFSD/hFskcLEsx0SDmmF68mq4ACJ3ywu0Fy0tOywDdYGXrQUZ0s++7rP3+ACacopW2P 7w3SxUr7hXRFbdf7G4DfC/Lgvmux8oCbTBm+0Jh+CaGElZyMyvZgfC+q7ZCAchdI48vl IAWw==
X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20251104; t=1783033386; x=1783638186; h=cc:to:subject:message-id:date:from:in-reply-to:references :mime-version:x-gm-gg:x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc:subject:date :message-id:reply-to; bh=7VpgNKWuumHymO83GBBD2TJ3w7J4HixgEug6pLVib48=; b=dc+D/inO3HLbOLZFZ3v1G2HPMYE5qjtOJHWFuo0tUUGjatMYIw6k6U6hPgQh4lYhS3 AnH2x28Ti65WjsnTerLyDdHQNFojqT0zwsIAL5tcoYW57ABNZ+HDhIWrd4rjx9LZd9ze LcfX2h9oznPFEVi/9rC5Jx9663DoTqqv7a6cq0onYO0ZILLpQy5y5gg/QBoxkB8riDk4 hpGFByHXY07WaLGb78LCAShsbXrk1qPlRkjeCwP8r+JIwY9yL1PhFn8yVZgXoZggxIR1 kjgfUbWYIdzjC4xiLsgUksKqgT+Qk99f19lRVhtbHyZH6XkQ/F0Tp0ZPE5iXauyW1mRi Cd7g==
X-Forwarded-Encrypted: i=1; AHgh+RpI7UPxyzue0extDb1UHTivLxYUTGDZuPvULr4pR4/GDPf+nBWGOKW4DwQW3DpnPEoQESo=@ietf.org
X-Gm-Message-State: AOJu0YyUWGqpCbbjxnC8y2EyHoP73gHRbHPA6hknUL8Igfe4KUgqnV2E iO6kWrhjclGn2FPgFCQ19JKo2qdWIcVb37jdsFhiEfriHirQgqCI/l9tsA1pUpzq4ax3wgE42qd WEPlGBqzUXuAYRxBFM1GJhDe2HYcB8Zk=
X-Gm-Gg: AfdE7cnl3I3Fms+klO70It6omCFy5hCOce2wyl4mKpiaO8h9tzFTgO+EdauELH2EMq4 MVYG4fNam5A3tmO5QZMPyrMDbyCSmLonFtFaxU7qi09wXEGGM7wYwMVyjoyYO2NrA62OmA0RH3O qxnCiNyPtTdsyc4ZTq0h44TgvhWiVQMhlNe17kw8DNx4rpZAgJAGYIc7nIojKpkdZccHsEWvLI/ ba4FmC2zaoFIdsHWudN4ejrrIEPXYEFopRIWiQR2mlfGTw1kVMDCtlOFh5lLjSLY58bnvMNZtrX XTf4VlXbZ72Gb2RXW/HzIzEnwPER8ua7fbPBEI78n+WDmlqQ+XOnNbjWkccF/u9/4pUxvUahGai bglTHmHpIvdwZ5Dio+8zLwBAqiTmuqzRWmGNDI0XQLkDKVO8L8LKxTv71OJSQ3jXCf1A/pW7w81 SRNejLFxTiCvtCNxHQbfoVnwxLuaX1
X-Received: by 2002:a05:6512:8050:b0:5ae:b8f2:a639 with SMTP id 2adb3069b0e04-5aec67a51a2mr1283951e87.19.1783033385577; Thu, 02 Jul 2026 16:03:05 -0700 (PDT)
MIME-Version: 1.0
References: <178231320760.1520243.5914961961176039994@dt-datatracker-f9b87776f-8pmmg> <2366159b6976368114c8c036bf379fa3e5795a6c.camel@vennard.ch> <GV1PR08MB7346E945D86A9555C78920C5D3E82@GV1PR08MB7346.eurprd08.prod.outlook.com> <CAMjbhoWHWvZTjBCKovXqPYaa2hS=fpgOZq2c=iYybusQxaxNuA@mail.gmail.com> <GV1PR08MB734606987FAC468551496CE4D3F72@GV1PR08MB7346.eurprd08.prod.outlook.com>
In-Reply-To: <GV1PR08MB734606987FAC468551496CE4D3F72@GV1PR08MB7346.eurprd08.prod.outlook.com>
From: Daniel Apon <dapon.crypto@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 02 Jul 2026 19:02:53 -0400
X-Gm-Features: AVVi8Cf_GaWqfz7vbXqOo_SyuZCU31A8OxeqxthwvIKqU7jG-saw0oBU4HtIvL4
Message-ID: <CAPxHsS+Vx06CSCNUKJcXJ7nWzyKpyMod8p8cZ6jX+wkGsqDryg@mail.gmail.com>
To: Yaakov Stein <ystein=40allot.com@dmarc.ietf.org>
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="00000000000091f2140655a8cf38"
Message-ID-Hash: Z7JPXC2MKZXDI6JYWBFCYQODNH4FESEZ
X-Message-ID-Hash: Z7JPXC2MKZXDI6JYWBFCYQODNH4FESEZ
X-MailFrom: dapon.crypto@gmail.com
X-Mailman-Rule-Misses: dmarc-mitigation; no-senders; approved; emergency; loop; banned-address; member-moderation; header-match-tls.ietf.org-0; nonmember-moderation; administrivia; implicit-dest; max-recipients; max-size; news-moderation; no-subject; digests; suspicious-header
CC: Bas Westerbaan <bas=40cloudflare.com@dmarc.ietf.org>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
X-Mailman-Version: 3.3.9rc6
Precedence: list
Subject: [TLS] Re: [EXTERNAL] Re: Re: WG Last Call: draft-ietf-tls-mlkem-08 (Ends 2026-07-08)
List-Id: "This is the mailing list for the Transport Layer Security working group of the IETF." <tls.ietf.org>
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/85xnmL7z53EkF55LBh0MGZhc9Fc>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/tls>
List-Help: <mailto:tls-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Owner: <mailto:tls-owner@ietf.org>
List-Post: <mailto:tls@ietf.org>
List-Subscribe: <mailto:tls-join@ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:tls-leave@ietf.org>

"The additional algebraic structure leads to more angles of attack

which for other rings (e.g., non-cyclotomic ones) has led to problems.

I believe this is why NIST preferred Kyber over NewHope."

Huh. I can actually provide the objective, definitive answer to your
speculation.

I preferred Kyber over NewHope for a straightforward reason: NewHope had
only Cat 1 and Cat 5 parameter sets, but not a Cat 3 parameter set. Kyber
had Cats 1, 3, and 5.

I don't know what to say about the rest of your email; I don't have
anything good to say there.

On Tue, Jun 30, 2026 at 8:40 AM Yaakov Stein <ystein=
40allot.com@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:

> Bas,
>
>
>
> You’re right, I should have said “less secure” about NewHope.
>
> The additional algebraic structure leads to more angles of attack
>
> which for other rings (e.g., non-cyclotomic ones) has led to problems.
>
> I believe this is why NIST preferred Kyber over NewHope.
>
> And there HAVE been partially successful “special” and “implementation”
> attacks
>
> (e.g., *Security of NewHope Under Partial Key Exposure*).
>
> And now that ring-based LWE has not been selected less effort is being
> expended in that direction.
>
>
>
> ML-KEM is delightfully simple?
>
> Granted that it has only 3 primitives, and reuses NTT and Keccak,
>
> but like any new protocol it has numerous pitfalls and edge conditions
>
> and I have been told that it isn’t easy to implement efficiently while
> protecting against timing attacks.
>
> I once implemented AES (which is trivial compared to Kyber) in FPGA
>
> and came away with a healthy respect for getting simple things right in
> low level production code.
>
>
>
> What would convince me?
>
>    1. 5 years from now with no significant compromise discovered
>
>
>
> OR
>
>
>
>    2. CRQCs become so prevalent that it is inexpensive to Shor ECDLP
>    algorithms
>
>
>
> OR a combination of
>
>
>
>    3. tighter (dimension preserving) reductions of ML-KEM to general SVP
>    for real parameter choices
>
> AND
>
>    4. analytical evidence that you can’t beat LLL/BKZ approaches to
>    structureless SVP
>
>
>
> OK, I am sure that you will say that this latter is a stricter condition
> than that applied to RSA/ECDLP -
>
> but
>
>    1. this is according to Sagan’s standard
>
> *the more a claim departs from the status quo, the stronger the evidence
> required to accept it*
>
>    2. there is strong experimental evidence that these are really
>    subexponential
>    3. there was no previous generation with which to hybridize these
>
>                 in case of someone finding a polynomial algorithm.
>
>
>
> Y(J)S
>
>
>
>
>
> *From:* Bas Westerbaan <bas=40cloudflare.com@dmarc.ietf.org>
> *Sent:* Monday, June 29, 2026 6:02 PM
> *To:* Yaakov Stein <ystein@allot.com>
> *Cc:* Antony Vennard <antony@vennard.ch>; Joseph Salowey <joe@salowey.net>;
> draft-ietf-tls-mlkem@ietf.org; tls-chairs@ietf.org; tls@ietf.org
> *Subject:* Re: [TLS] Re: WG Last Call: draft-ietf-tls-mlkem-08 (Ends
> 2026-07-08)
>
>
>
> That is a good argument, but the crux is "no attack has been demosntrated"
> is not the same as "no attack will be found"
> and certainly not the same as "no attack exists".
> Modular LWE (k>1) is a compromise between efficient but insecure Ring
> based (k=1) LWE, and complex but more secure LWE over the integers.
>
>
>
> Sorry, I must've missed the memo, but could you give me a pointer why the
> RLWE scheme A New Hope is "insecure"?
>
>
>
> I'd say MLWE is simpler to implement if you're doing more than one
> security level. Also, taken as a whole, ML-KEM is a delightfully simple
> algorithm.
>
>
>
> We can't yet be sure that this compromise is as secure as it seems.
>
>
>
> You wrote "yet". What would make you change your mind?
>
>
>
> Best,
>
>
>
>  Bas
> This message is intended only for the designated recipient(s). It may
> contain confidential or proprietary information. If you are not the
> designated recipient, you may not review, copy or distribute this message.
> If you have mistakenly received this message, please notify the sender by a
> reply e-mail and delete this message. Thank you.
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list -- tls@ietf.org
> To unsubscribe send an email to tls-leave@ietf.org
>