[TLS] Re: WG Last Call: draft-ietf-tls-mlkem-08 (Ends 2026-07-08)

"Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen" <mjos.crypto@gmail.com> Thu, 02 July 2026 15:59 UTC

Return-Path: <mjos.crypto@gmail.com>
X-Original-To: tls@mail2.ietf.org
Delivered-To: tls@mail2.ietf.org
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by mail2.ietf.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 31AED10CB2F57 for <tls@mail2.ietf.org>; Thu, 2 Jul 2026 08:59:21 -0700 (PDT)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=ietf.org; s=ietf1; t=1783007961; bh=BkRfEs6OS1SMJcYeT/eZxnP014SLNzAaqDuX11qRh00=; h=References:In-Reply-To:From:Date:Subject:To; b=PrPPkWU9msWKrCxznbPPqcNLoP5pxjcE6vV1Tr5Gg2Qypc6Vgnv7PLDk6aR5THF9T 2Jx4OFobZ4XU+1c5S8OR2qnzwF5bywoMW+5Fngwgi4I38neIs/QORnp/xK2y4782dJ eDY1/7YoYpVadgb2+lmH4uMNApR1EllV6M8lXeig=
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at ietf.org
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.098
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.098 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_EF=-0.1, FREEMAIL_FROM=0.001, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Authentication-Results: mail2.ietf.org (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=gmail.com
Received: from mail2.ietf.org ([166.84.6.31]) by localhost (mail2.ietf.org [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id ZK2w31iyb_v6 for <tls@mail2.ietf.org>; Thu, 2 Jul 2026 08:59:20 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from mail-pf1-x42b.google.com (mail-pf1-x42b.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:4864:20::42b]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (128/128 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature ECDSA (P-256) server-digest SHA256) (No client certificate requested) by mail2.ietf.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 081B210CB2F46 for <tls@ietf.org>; Thu, 2 Jul 2026 08:59:20 -0700 (PDT)
Received: by mail-pf1-x42b.google.com with SMTP id d2e1a72fcca58-847a69ba83dso1167693b3a.2 for <tls@ietf.org>; Thu, 02 Jul 2026 08:59:19 -0700 (PDT)
ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; t=1783007959; cv=none; d=google.com; s=arc-20260327; b=mjnHLDmOgm+yhbGoGJBDEIT1yXDYQ4rE1imxRyKanYhH52X//rdzRi5bnRHXO1gI27 7pAIglf1eYM4WZPfpq3qoINT3HiVD0W+i0N3zKN+Ci9gLTNbhk4EUskluBkLCJQ4OowF 4pT8N6cO9RyFPe9koeIhn249zPL5CIdgU7GeZPuLaq0XEn2YRx7gMulfSXsXmF3m9SIQ O4uI2pOReyT8ry4bAmFHP0mnFUMb7oeCCzW4hBu3lQiUOOol4mHPGCk9T9yCf9Umpez/ cJ0zv61mbeMRmktpZGTrrDKY1Is0IUYVoRCGo6AXF4uJnMd6GaCHgO8QhSvJr63yQGqr AlIg==
ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=arc-20260327; h=to:subject:message-id:date:from:in-reply-to:references:mime-version :dkim-signature; bh=BkRfEs6OS1SMJcYeT/eZxnP014SLNzAaqDuX11qRh00=; fh=iMQEz7fIE2XtFWqLUMEt8tz+aEDEJVSqHa2ftqd9oME=; b=eGVTgrnLP5rWluekcwJlAB+O6YOi3YCLj/eD8Vg87RaGyKGpjuNJ3oJDKoKi2yZxEy zY1HLax0/5mhJ+pAHDFRRx8fOntDjTpmqp+c0fgmmrpHzXuIyhvAjPUvTOukqMpuVLDB wg4hJOMujCGnNp2tlWTo/GtGogUn1u9pnTIN02h+LDlRxNsGOO0TYWM3RMuv6uPAblDd uzkkWNSc20EGMgp7t8JpNkCB9Qf1Qo1PbuiIrjBpmZxB5LPS76Y6LEyW75czDevphOkR aQzqkUfhzKiM+gMWP/WJR52hJ6P3BlkS5YuaEYEBl0LqlgTgcymVqaqHz20pAgQuasRv aW3Q==; darn=ietf.org
ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; mx.google.com; arc=none
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20251104; t=1783007959; x=1783612759; darn=ietf.org; h=to:subject:message-id:date:from:in-reply-to:references:mime-version :from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:reply-to; bh=BkRfEs6OS1SMJcYeT/eZxnP014SLNzAaqDuX11qRh00=; b=EVB6hR3BNjAEZgCymJdr9brIWD0ZxCXIM0zGEy6wmhotKSO+C41gp+Mmx7VcQWTNy9 YRtD3FCNmCL5jnUkFl0Gc7WG1+FCzsy6eoCBaRLQS/Hl9SskUxXQa+AQG/20F3/BlgLG HTQkJHB3/OFI1eh80RU85sxqQpIMQmquOP2kFVf/HsHryxuuGcSmIpMzHjtKkakCZpHI aBRjzGlDvWi44QUKyB5U8VnnI6X+mw0+8sAFZR6gNzRPQDWc/cQQbPVbXBvuccgSM/Hd Jn5z0qDAn/l0e+UBGoJDD7chM6fZaH8sbnztSfjzjGxagms/a/D5s8Ux0wvmt44HdHpt GMwA==
X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20251104; t=1783007959; x=1783612759; h=to:subject:message-id:date:from:in-reply-to:references:mime-version :x-gm-gg:x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id :reply-to; bh=BkRfEs6OS1SMJcYeT/eZxnP014SLNzAaqDuX11qRh00=; b=AA4Nmrdh2NHcyc+Y9RQFz/jI/zpyp0OFMNesCA0OmGeofY2+U0Nk8PhH5HLkKPRcbg DflAPatY7+Kyb69ddzY/EKO4lbM2Mx3hEQs13cvmk4PCbHrAxFCLjYNAouG7rrAnDqMS gCwC+evZ2sgauwiVpi2nMyqakxf9z7u+U9H7lsxsDSPKze5E3z9gN7/qI9sER29Tqy6j ydSvnj7mauwJFrE6usfoflP+SSI9qX8X7GvSJuBrzu4bd7rrXTVoc09K2AM19L2KRWuW 5rln1bjpaLk0Xe0UFc5+ESK+ecbUlR2zjB5CC3ByNjU4gFsi0XoWCDEmphwNVakXAFG8 3eQg==
X-Gm-Message-State: AOJu0YxP5qOFqbIuXUvzfZcYtwiXgxYi+okw32vQmOqNWEizVKT/cw6V JSkhIvDrbPnT7BQNLACt4tr664KsPSxFFI9MgfQLLA3DS05adUQYM0AhK/GI1/cmTftNEZHDWd8 WJmfjstfaCbyi7m7FDJ8HvY33FK/X8kqGYg==
X-Gm-Gg: AfdE7cnnqz3Lg79l7vsv2KvsB+Bo2LRmyw9/1TXneneuX1vcYum/oNmDTDIMxG9bjXD fBjer4gly3ew4EgISqHkCiwsri1U48QDQfvKTLs7RgH/mIyb1tPOiVB56/RLZJt8x4Za9BEvrrY BQPSeatOCPvIBTEhZZTf0bmJgs4V4VIbadZpuAqcxqnkzgsJP0rAyHF7AV6KWlK/kXPEU3w7+fj O/0UZC5VjLP7WWF0k6Ug4Er5y1wRxWSuUclC06nBoihVsfiGlgngsLuz2ITc+fo0e7omiQcLtjv cfBTDqzesFNbNxe6iISliJiV4JLoErbYH6tk3ZzJPXhAO4nKjUrtI1ggH4nF
X-Received: by 2002:a05:6a00:4f86:b0:847:997b:1182 with SMTP id d2e1a72fcca58-847c099b200mr6697079b3a.59.1783007958999; Thu, 02 Jul 2026 08:59:18 -0700 (PDT)
MIME-Version: 1.0
References: <CA+iU_q=8bDayFTsmVY03TmSK9uQjXtxcOrxgC07hXA4kyUtTaw@mail.gmail.com>
In-Reply-To: <CA+iU_q=8bDayFTsmVY03TmSK9uQjXtxcOrxgC07hXA4kyUtTaw@mail.gmail.com>
From: "Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen" <mjos.crypto@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 02 Jul 2026 18:59:06 +0300
X-Gm-Features: AVVi8Cc5bvok9pNA0n7XAlJhwYfrlY91rc-Lk_dZVMVGGyQp_6-7wo8iuzlg1cY
Message-ID: <CA+iU_qm7=REVXLjs74iSQUoNUcAfhRHBChJfs9j0fBZT5oQGrA@mail.gmail.com>
To: tls@ietf.org
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="0000000000000725bf0655a2e41f"
Message-ID-Hash: P724GBW24EUL3SS2Q7N4RC3NFRECSEQV
X-Message-ID-Hash: P724GBW24EUL3SS2Q7N4RC3NFRECSEQV
X-MailFrom: mjos.crypto@gmail.com
X-Mailman-Rule-Misses: dmarc-mitigation; no-senders; approved; emergency; loop; banned-address; member-moderation; header-match-tls.ietf.org-0; nonmember-moderation; administrivia; implicit-dest; max-recipients; max-size; news-moderation; no-subject; digests; suspicious-header
X-Mailman-Version: 3.3.9rc6
Precedence: list
Subject: [TLS] Re: WG Last Call: draft-ietf-tls-mlkem-08 (Ends 2026-07-08)
List-Id: "This is the mailing list for the Transport Layer Security working group of the IETF." <tls.ietf.org>
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/h-BUbmcwuJC38AXTSkfs1OuDgm8>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/tls>
List-Help: <mailto:tls-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Owner: <mailto:tls-owner@ietf.org>
List-Post: <mailto:tls@ietf.org>
List-Subscribe: <mailto:tls-join@ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <mailto:tls-leave@ietf.org>

I meant -- live attacks against non-PQC.

Cheers,
-markku

Dr. Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen <mjos@iki.fi>


On Thu, Jul 2, 2026 at 6:53 PM Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen <
mjos.crypto@gmail.com> wrote:

> Hi All,
>
>
> I'd like to see a specification for "pure" ML-KEM for TLS published as an
> informational RFC. This is mainly because of low-end hardware use cases --
> but first, some notes:
>
> This is an informational RFC -- there is no obligation to implement or use
> it, and I don't see draft-ietf-tls-mlkem-08 promoting it for general use
> (the quoted IANA "Recommended: N" column seemigly implies the opposite). To
> me, publishing an Informational RFC primarily means that there is a freely
> available and stable specification that enables interoperable
> implementations when needed. I think it is useful that a stable
> specification for pure ML-KEM exists long before live attacks against PQC
> start to occur, and more organizations will want to drop hybrid.
>
> As a sidenote, we already have the Chinese TLS 1.3 Cipher Suites (RFC
> 8998), Russian TLS 1.2 Cipher Suites (RFC 9189), etc., and a lot more
> obscure and weird ones too. Those didn't generate nearly as much discussion
> and passion as this seems to have.
>
> Why would I personally need a spec for pure ML-KEM it right now? While
> hybrid seems "easy" from a software viewpoint, ECDH and ML-KEM don't share
> many hardware resources; ECDH is "big integer" arithmetic, while ML-KEM is
> ring arithmetic; ML-KEM and ML-DSA use the SHA3 family, while legacy crypto
> uses SHA2, etc. With hybrid, one is significantly increasing the size and
> complexity of a hardware implementation with little verifiable security
> advantage.
>
>
> As a cryptographer and security engineer, I don't have much sentimental
> attachment to Elliptic Curve Cryptography. Individuals and organizations
> can certainly use hybrids, but I just don't see directly identifiable
> security value in it for the use cases I have. So: I personally don't want
> to have ECDH baggage on my chip simply due to some "belts and suspenders"
> argument.
>
>
> ps. On the same vein -- It would be absolutely fantastic if we could get
> rid of HKDF as it is the one thing in TLS 1.3 forcing masked SHA2 on my
> chip. As a symmetric cryptography design, HKDF is about as inelegant as
> possible, and currently one of the hardest things to mask & secure in
> hardware. Arguably better SHA3-based KDFs have existed for a long time, and
> I'd like to use my masked Keccak module for KDF. But that's perhaps for
> later.
>
>
> Cheers,
> -markku
>
> Dr. Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen <mjos@iki.fi>
>