[TLS] Re: WG Last Call: draft-ietf-tls-mlkem-08 (Ends 2026-07-08)

Andrew Lee <andrew@joseon.com> Thu, 02 July 2026 03:03 UTC

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From: Andrew Lee <andrew@joseon.com>
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Date: Wed, 01 Jul 2026 20:03:29 -0700
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To: Yaroslav Rosomakho <yrosomakho@zscaler.com>
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CC: Kevin Milner <kamilner@kamilner.ca>, Nadim Kobeissi <nadim@symbolic.software>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: [TLS] Re: WG Last Call: draft-ietf-tls-mlkem-08 (Ends 2026-07-08)
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Dear Yaroslav,

Somehow, this doesn't look like a Wall of Shame, but instead an example of why this RFC should not be published.

All of these public libraries implemented solo ML-KEM without the need for this draft to be published. In other words, we don't need a published standard for implementations to proliferate and gain real world experience.

Governments and compliance bodies, on the other hand, use RFCs as a normative reference, just like the Canadian Cyber Centre said they would do.

To be clear, every single one of those implementations, as you said, does not enable solo ML-KEM by default. Publishing this RFC will change that.

Best,
Andrew

> On Jul 1, 2026, at 7:46 PM, Yaroslav Rosomakho <yrosomakho@zscaler.com> wrote:
> 
> 
> On Wed, Jul 1, 2026 at 2:59 PM Andrew Lee <andrew@joseon.com <mailto:andrew@joseon.com>> wrote:
>> On Jul 1, 2026, at 2:22 PM, Kevin Milner <kamilner@kamilner.ca <mailto:kamilner@kamilner.ca>> wrote:
>>> several very widely deployed libraries and applications are already implementing pure ML-KEM (I believe several have been cited previously in the discussion of this draft, by both sides), and I suspect more will over time.
>> Do you happen to have a few examples or a link to this so-called wall of shame?
> 
> I'm afraid you will have pretty much all mainstream TLS libraries on your "wall of shame".
>  
> As far as I can tell, at least the following libraries implement pure ML-KEM support in TLS according to this specification:
> - OpenSSL (ML-KEM-512/768/1024)
> - BoringSSL (ML-KEM-1024)
> - AWS-LC (ML-KEM-512/768/1024)
> - Rustls (ML-KEM-768/1024)
> - s2n-tls (ML-KEM-1024)
> - Bouncy Castle (ML-KEM-512/768/1024)
> - Botan (ML-KEM-512/768/1024)
> - GnuTLS (ML-KEM-768/1024)
> - WolfSSL (ML-KEM-512/768/1024)
> 
> I believe that, with the exception of WolfSSL all these libraries do not require compile-time feature flags to enable pure ML-KEM support. Worth noting that as far as I can tell none of these libraries enable pure ML-KEM in the default TLS configuration, they require users to make an explicit choice to enable it.
> 
> Hope this helps.
> 
> -yaroslav
> 
> 
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