[TLS] Re: WG Last Call: draft-ietf-tls-mlkem-08 (Ends 2026-07-08)

Soatok Dreamseeker <soatok.dhole@gmail.com> Thu, 09 July 2026 14:16 UTC

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From: Soatok Dreamseeker <soatok.dhole@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 09 Jul 2026 10:16:11 -0400
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Subject: [TLS] Re: WG Last Call: draft-ietf-tls-mlkem-08 (Ends 2026-07-08)
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That's all fine and well, but parasocial interactions tend to get toxic. I
believe this tendency will be exacerrbated when not tempered with the
awareness that there are excellent people beyond your "faves" participating
in the discussion.

On Thu, Jul 9, 2026 at 9:44 AM Andrew Lee <andrew@joseon.com> wrote:

> Dear John,
>
> Evaluating participant track record is due diligence, and further, part of
> the rough consensus process.
>
> Every single cryptographer is standing on the shoulders of giants like
> Diffie, Hellman, Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman. Attempting to dismiss such
> recognition leaves me… curious (without a better choice of words).
>
> Whenever I see someone dismissing their more distinguished peers, I am
> reminded of this study [1].
>
> Sincerely,
> Andrew
>
> [1] https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11126-025-10227-6
>
>
> On Jul 9, 2026, at 1:34 AM, John Mattsson <john.mattsson=
> 40ericsson.com@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:
>
> I think the tendency to idolize people such as Bernstein causes a lot of
> problems: it leads people to evaluate arguments based on who makes them
> rather than on their technical merits. Whenever I see someone idolizing
> another person, I am reminded of this study [1].
>
> A major strength of the IETF is that it brings together participants from
> industry, governments, and academia. None of these groups is inherently
> neutral. Industry participants often advocate for approaches that benefit
> their businesses, and while many researchers are admirably objective,
> others strongly promote their own work.
>
> I do not think it would be wise to exclude people affiliated with
> governments from leadership roles. I would welcome greater participation
> from ANSSI and other EU agencies in the IETF, and I believe the IETF needs
> as many competent people as possible to volunteer for various positions.
> These roles involve difficult, unpaid, and often very underappreciated
> work. The key issue is not institutional affiliation; it is ensuring that
> decisions are made transparently and based on technical merit.
>
> Cheers,
> John Preuß Mattsson
>
> [1] https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC8574017/
>
> *From: *Harry Halpin <hhalpin@ibiblio.org>
> *Date: *Wednesday, 8 July 2026 at 20:33
> *To: *
> *Cc: *tls@ietf.org <tls@ietf.org>
> *Subject: *[TLS] Re: WG Last Call: draft-ietf-tls-mlkem-08 (Ends
> 2026-07-08)
>
> Hi everyone,
>
> I do not support the publication of the document.
>
> Overall, given the immaturity of the standards and lack of real clarity
> over safe parameters, and given the importance of TLS in encrypting most of
> the world’s traffic in combination with the fairly low additional overhead
> of hybrid KEM mode for TLS, I think it makes sense to in general to
> recommend to use hybrid mode with X25519. Of course an Informational RFC is
> not a recommendation, but it can easily and will be viewed as such.
>
> As a former W3C staff member, I do understand there is a fairly informal
> process for Informational IETF RFCs and internally they are viewed more as
> house-keeping for implementers, but one must remember for the outside
> world, including many implementers, even Informational RFCs are treated as
> de-facto standards. So additional care must be taken and a certain degree
> of conservatism should be expected. As an implementer, for example, at
> Nym, our VPN product uses hybrid mode with ML-KEM and X25519, and is
> working on implementing support for non-lattice postquantum alternatives
> just to be extra paranoid.
>
> However this may be a bit off topic and non-technical, in addition to
> various purely technical arguments, but I do think it would be healthy for
> the IETF to discuss the role of the NSA inside the IETF which is the
> underlying issue leading to a clear lack of consensus over what could be a
> minor Informational RFC. The IETF as a body of individual engineers did a
> remarkable job post-Snowden in pushing through TLS 1.3 and gained the trust
> of much of the larger international community (developers, users, and
> nation-states), and X25519 - due to its neutral academic background and the
> personal reputation for integrity by DJB and Lange - was very well-received
> as an option to the NIST curves in TLS.  The IETF received a
> well-deserved reputation this for being relatively free of undue US
> influence.
>
> So it should come as no surprise, given the NSA’s original and
> well-documented historically attempted suppression of public key
> cryptography, backdoors in RNGs, and weakened standards means of course
> that when the NSA asks to drop all options - in even an Informational RFC -
> but ML-KEM in TLS that many people are concerned. So the real danger here
> is that the IETF loses its popular legitimacy due to following the NSA’s
> recommendation given to the IETF years ago to remove X25519 hybrid mode, as
> the RFC may be seen not as as an “option” but as the recommended way to do
> it by implementers unaware of the intricacies of the IETF and what
> “Informational” means in terms of IETF process.
>
> How to avoid this problem in the future? I understand that any process
> change is outside of the scope of the TLS WG, but we will bring it up with
> the IESG and IAB. The IETF is composed of individuals, not institutions
> like the NSA, so it seems reasonable that while individuals can participate
> as individuals, I would recommend any individual affiliated with a national
> security agency like the NSA, not chair any Working Group, serve as editors
> of documents, and should not “drive” a process. It is important to be
> neutral so this practice should apply across any security agency, like
> ANSSI in France and so forth. The problem is exceptionally important today
> to make sure the IETF is not controlled by US institutions as they are
> increasingly viewed globally as not trustworthy due to the current
> geopolitical climate engendered by Trump, and if would be tragic for the
> internet if the IETF lost its legitimacy due to a real or even just
> perceived influence of any geopolitical actor. The mission to prevent the
> internet from fragmenting over postquantum cryptography - or any other
> issue - is of utmost importance to future generations, and minor procedural
> issues can thus have outsized importance down the line, as we learned with
> the standardization of DRM at W3C.
>
>    Yours,
>       Harry
>
>
>
>
>
> On Wed, 8 Jul 2026 at 17:42, James <jameshoweee@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> Hi,
>
> I support publishing draft-ietf-tls-mlkem-08.
>
> Best,
> James
>
> On Wed, 8 Jul 2026, 14:33 BARNETT Anthony, <
> Anthony.Barnett@uk.thalesgroup.com> wrote:
>
> Classified as: {OPEN}
>
> I support publication of this document.
>
>
> Anthony Barnett
>
> {OPEN}
>
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